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The purpose of this research was to investigate problems
in management of Navy warranty contract clauses, as the
result of recent legislation mandating cost effective
warranty coverage for major weapon systems. This
investigation involved the following: 1) Identification of
warranty benefits and recent warranty legislation, 2)
Review and comparison of Services and Navy Systems Command
implementation procedures, and 3) Analysis of five warranty
contract clauses. The methodology for this research
involved current literature and interviews with Government
and industry officials involved with warranty issues.
As a result of this analysis, the conclusions are as
follows: 1) Actual costs and estimating techniques need
definition and refinement, 2) Navy implementation
procedures must be integrated and coordinated, and 3) Early
on planning in weapon system development is required to
avoid potential problems. This study recommends that a
single warranty management information system be
established. Management procedures and reporting formats
should be standardized as much as possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. AREA OF RESEARCH
With the implementation of Section 2403 to Title 10
United States Code, Weapon Systems Warranty Act, and
Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 46.7, quality and performance
risks, which were formerly self-insured, have shifted from
the Government to weapon systems contractors. This shift in
risk assumption has translated into increased warranty
coverage for major weapon systems procured by the Department
of Defense. This thesis concerns the Navy administration of
this warranty coverage.
B. DISCUSSION
Using warranties to assign some type of quality
accountability has long been a common practice in private
industry, while in the Department of Defense, (DOD) , the use
of warranties has only been sporadically applied since 1964.
Ideally, warranty coverage maintains the quality of a
product over its useful life. The seller assumes the
majority of the risk that the product, whether it be an
automobile or a complex fighter aircraft, will operate as
intended.
With increasing weapon system costs and the horror
stories of unreliable weapon systems, such as the Air Force
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C-5A and the Army DIVAD Tank, Congress has recently
legislated that DOD implement a major weapon systems
warranty policy.
Applying warranties to state-of-the-art complex weapon
systems is an extremely difficult task. There are numerous
variables which have to be taken into account. Using
warranties in a haphazard manner could cost the Government
significant sums of money and time. In the DOD's case,
improper application of warranties could have detrimental
effects on national defense through readiness.
In order to realize the full benefits of warranties, the
Navy must carefully analyze the management of warranties.
Spending millions of dollars to obtain warranty coverage
does not automatically ensure the quality of a weapon
system. If the Fleet is to receive quality benefits,
warranties must be made to work in a cost effective manner.
Effective warranty management is the crucial link for
ensuring this happens.
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The main objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. Identify warranty management procedures implemented
to date.
2. Review similar warranty contract clauses to highlight
variability in contract clause elements.
3. Discern any actual or potential problems from warranty




The primary research question is as follows:
What are the key problems in management of Navy warranty
clauses as the result of new regulations mandating cost
effective warranty coverage for major weapon systems and
how might warranty administration be improved?
Subsidiary research questions are as follows:
1. What is a warranty and how is it applied to Navy
weapon systems?
2. What are current Navy warranty administration
procedures and what are the critical problems in
applying these procedures?
3. What are the principal variables or factors which
affect warranty administration?
4. What significant court cases and Armed Services Board
of Contract Appeals cases have occurred involving
warranty administration of major weapon systems, and
what precedents can be applied?
5. What modifications could be made to existing warranty
provisions in order to enhance the administration of
such warranties?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The basic research for this thesis was developed from a
comprehensive study of current literature and from
interviews with the following:
1. Members of the Navy Warranty Ad Hoc Group.
2. Navy Systems Commands 1 Warranty Team members.
3
.
Recommended technical and contracting personnel at the
Hardware Systems Commands, Ships Parts Control Center
and Aviation Supply Office.
4. Officer-in-Charge, U.S. Air Force Product Performance
Agreement Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,
Ohio.
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5. Director, Warranty Management, Policy and Plans,
Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington D.C..
6. Various Audit agencies including:
a. General Accounting Office, (Detroit Regional
Office)
b. Department of Defense Inspector General, Auditing
c. Navy Inspector General
d. Naval Audit Service Southwest Region
e. Air Force Audit Agency, Norton Air Force Base, CA
7. Director of Contracts at selected major weapon systems
contractors.
Appendix A provides a list of individuals who either were
interviewed or provided information for this research.
Appendix B provides a list of the general questions used in
the interviews.
In addition to the above, five warranty contract clauses
from the following major system programs were reviewed.
1. HARM Missile System
2. SPARROW Missile System
3. SIDEWINDER Missile System
4. TOMAHAWK Missile System
5. Commercial Communications Satellite from Hughes
Aircraft Company
These programs were selected based on recommendations from
knowledgeable personnel familiar with warranty coverage from
Navy Systems Commands. The results of the study reflect
those actions and issues that were in existence as of July
1986.
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F. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The general direction of the thesis is to provide a
brief overview of the contractual aspects of Navy warranty
administration of major weapon systems, to review warranty
management procedures that are currently used or being
developed, and to analyze the impact of warranty contract
clause elements on warranty administration. This thesis
does not include shipbuilding or ship overhaul warranty
administration except in a very basic overview. No attempt
was made to collect raw data at the Fleet level because of
the newness of the warranty requirement.
G. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this study, the following
definitions are provided:
1. Warranty—The term warranty is used in a number of
contexts. Its most restrictive meaning occurs in the
traditional Government contract warranty clause (less
frequently referred to as a Guaranty clause) which
simply gives the Government a remedy for patent
defects discovered after acceptance. The reason for
including such a clause is to overcome the finality of
acceptance. Another meaning, the most common
commercial use of the term, is that a warranty is a
promise of the seller regarding the quality of the
goods. In this sense the term is used to determine
when a defect exists rather than to provide a remedy
for the defect. [1:614]
2
.
Material and Workmanship—This warranty is designed to
provide an incentive for the contractor to consistent-
ly produce a weapon system that conforms to all manu-
facturing drawings and quality standards. The
warranty is most important during the early periods of
production. [2:9]
3. Design and manufacturing requirements—These terms
mean the structural and engineering plans and
13
manufacturing particulars, including precise measure-
ments, tolerances, materials and finished product
tests for the weapon system being produced.
[3:46.7-2]
4. Essential performance requirements—These terms mean
the operating capabilities and maintenance and
reliability characteristics of a weapon system that
are determined by the Secretary of Defense (or
delegated authority) to be necessary for it to fulfill
the military requirement for which the system is
designed. [3:46.7-3]
5. Initial production quantity—These terms mean the
number of units of a weapon system contracted for in
the first program year of full-scale production.
[3:46.7-3]
6. Mature full-scale production—These terms mean the
follow-on production of a weapon system after
manufacture of the lesser of the initial production




Prime Contractor—These terms mean a party that enters
into an agreement directly with the United States to
furnish a system or a major subsystem. [3:46.7-3]
8. Weapon System—These terms mean a system or major sub-
system used directly by the armed forces to carry out
combat missions. By way of illustration, the term
"weapon system" includes, but is not limited to the
following, if intended for use in carrying out combat
missions: tracked and wheeled combat vehicles; self-
propelled, towed and fixed guns, howitzers and
mortars; helicopters; naval vessels; . . . [3:46.7-3]
A "weapon system, " however, does not include the
following: [4:2]
a. Support equipment related to the items listed above,
such as ground handling equipment, training devices
and their accessories, or ammunition (unless an
effective warranty for the weapon system would re-
quire inclusion of such items)
;
b. Commercial items sold in substantial quantities to
the general public;
14
c. Any system that costs less than $100,000 per unit
or whose eventual total procurement cost is less
than $10,000,000;
d. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts (the Govern-
ment may, however, obtain warranties requested by an
FMS purchaser if a mutually satisfactory price and
arrangement can be negotiated)
.
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II describes the basic concept of warranties,
how they are used within contractual requirements, and a
brief explanation of the recent legislation directing cost
effective warranty coverage. Chapter III presents how each
service implemented the new warranty legislation through
service directives (at the time of this study both Navy and
Air Force instructions were in draft stage) . From there, an
analysis is made of how the Navy Systems Commands are
implementing warranty legislation. Using a case study
approach, Chapter IV shows how various contract clauses are
put together as the result of service implementation brought
out in Chapter III. The primary idea is to bring out the
important variables or factors of a warranty clause as
analyzed in the case study. The five contract clauses are
from the following programs: HARM, SPARROW, SIDEWINDER,
TOMAHAWK, and a commercial warranty for communications
spacecraft from Hughes Aircraft Company. Chapter V brings
out the various problems in warranty administration from
implementing the new law to applying contract clauses. This
is, in fact, basically the results of the research presented
15
in previous chapters. Chapter VI points out some




This chapter discusses the types of warranties available
to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the benefits to be
gained from warranty application. To demonstrate the
evolution of warranty regulations to the present, this
chapter highlights recent Congressional legislation
mandating warranty coverage of major weapon systems. Recent
military experience and the contractual application of
warranties is shown to provide a background to warranty
implementation by the various services.
B. WARRANTY TYPES
In order to understand issues concerning warranties, one
must first understand what a warranty is. The Federal
Acquisition Regulations provides this definition:
A warranty means a promise or affirmation given by a
contractor to the government regarding the nature,
usefulness, or conditions of supplies or performance
of services furnished under the contract. [5:46-9]
Along with the general definition above, warranties are
further broken down into two categories—implied and
express. An implied warranty has two main descriptions: 1.
That the owner maintains title to the product and has the
authority to sell it. 2. That the product meets the
standards of that particular industry and is suitable for
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use. [6:589] This type of warranty is a standard practice
throughout private industry. In an express warranty , the
seller warrants that the material delivered will meet the
order description or required performance. [6:589]
From the above definitions it can be inferred that
basically a warranty is like an insurance policy for the
buyer to guarantee certain product requirements. The seller
essentially assumes the risk that the product may fail
during the warranty coverage period. With this assumption
of additional risk, the seller generally charges the buyer
increased costs for this deferred liability. What is
currently in question is should the Government pay
additional costs, and if so, how much should these
warranties cost.
Within the Federal Government, two subsets of warranties
are used primarily: design warranties and performance
warranties. In a design warranty the contractor warrants
that the design of the product meets the specifications
provided by the buyer. In a performance warranty the
contractor warrants that the product will perform its
intended function at a certain level for a specified period.
[7:25]
Within the express warranty concept, three of the more
commonly used warranty plans in DOD acquisition include:
Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) , Mean Time Between
Failure Guarantee (MTBF) , and Logistic Support Cost
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Commitment (LSC) . Table 1 briefly lists the main features
of each plan.
The table is not inclusive of warranties used in the
DOD. Appendix C provides examples of other warranty-
variations available for DOD application.
When discussing warranties in DOD acquisition, one must
be careful in applying it appropriately. It can have
different meanings for the contractor, program manager,
technician, buyer, and the person in the field who uses the
equipment. When looking at warranty issues, one must
determine the type of warranty. Because of the many
different types of warranties used by DOD, the warranty
issue is far more complex than the warranty for a John Deere
tractor.
C. WARRANTY BENEFITS
Prior to discussing any of the issues associated with
warranties, it would be appropriate to look at some of the
benefits typically thought to be provided by warranties.
This allows for a more meaningful comparison to be made.
Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV recently
high-lighted quality gains by making defense contractors
more accountable for product quality through warranties.
[9:6] In a recent interview, Rear Admiral Stuart Piatt, the
Navy's Competition Advocate, espoused the advantages of
warranties, particularly as the Navy grows to a 600-ship
fleet. Admiral Piatt felt that warranties would enhance
19
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workmanship on the shop floor and at the same time hold down
operating costs. [10:15] From these indications it would
appear that DOD upper management is climbing aboard the
warranty "band wagon".
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At the working level the following provide some of the
possible advantages that may be incurred with warranty use.
- Direct or indirect motivation for designing and
producing reliable and maintainable equipment.
[11:5-62]
- Reduced initial requirements for support equipment,
training, and data. [11:5-62]
- Reduced initial logistics problem if contractor repair
is at "black box" level. [11:5-62]
- Long-term stabilized workflow for contractor repair work
and increased chances for follow-on procurements.
[11:5-62]
- Control of operational rather than test parameters.
[11:5-62]
- Trade-off potential for guarantee of higher-level
parameters, e.g., logistics support costs. [11:5-62]
- Extending contractor's responsibility to field perform-
ance. Without a written warranty, the Government
assumes all the risks for product performance and
support. Under warranty both the Government and the
contractor share the risks and rewards. [2:2-1]
- Improving performance, reliability, and quality. If
contractors are committed to correcting warranty
breaches at their expense, they have a strong motivation
to meet or exceed levels of performance. [2:2-1]
- Reducing life cycle costs. Contractors are motivated to
reduce repair costs to minimize their liability. This
could result in a corresponding reduction of support
costs for the Government. [2:2-1]
- Early and rapid resolution of problems. Due to the
warranty agreement and possible liabilities, problem
areas receive high visibility and gain management
attention. [2:2-1]
- Incentive for no-cost engineering change proposals.
[2:2-1]
- Realistic estimates of field performance. If contractor
projections are overly optimistic, funds from warranty
can be depleted rapidly and profits reduced. [2:2-1]
21
- Improved evaluation of field performance. The
contractor is motivated to participate in the early
evaluation of field failures. [2:2-1]
While all of the above benefits may not be realized on any
one warranty program, any one or combination of them could
be a significant step forward.
From a simplistic viewpoint, it would seem that the
contractor would be motivated without warranties to carry
out the above actions. With most major weapon systems
contractors, the Government is the sole customer of the firm
or makes up a large percentage of their business.
Therefore, should not the Government be treated in a "most
favored customer" status and not charged extra for the above
benefits.
These benefits or factors could be detrimental to the
Government if the warranty is not properly managed. For
example, the contractor might stay with "old", proven
technology instead of pushing the "leading edge" of
technological advances. Reliability may be increased, but
overall, long term performance may decrease. The above
advantages could also be viewed as disadvantages depending
on the criteria used to evaluate the warranty. There may be
short term dollar cost savings, but on the other side long
term readiness may suffer. Examples of this will be
discussed in succeeding chapters.
The above benefits of a warranty are not normally gained
without some cost. The contractor providing the warranty
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coverage will estimate all costs required to perform the
warranty coverage. The warranty price quoted by the
contractor would also most likely include a percentage for
profit to compensate for additional risk assumption.
[12:387]
Figure 1 presents a straightforward illustration of
warranty cost/benefit from both the Government and the
contractor viewpoint.
D. WARRANTY LEGISLATION
The DOD contracts have used warranty provisions for a
number of years on a selective basis. Prior to 1984 there
were no public laws or procurement regulations mandating
warranty use for weapon system. Because of the concept that
the Government (the DOD in particular) acted as a
self-insurer. The Government assumed the majority of risk.
With a background of public outcry against DOD
procurement abuses and increased defense spending, Senator
Mark Andrews in November 1983 introduced an amendment to the
1984 Defense Appropriations Act which required written
warranties in contracts for weapon systems. [13:63] Despite
vigorous DOD and private industry protests, Section 794 of
the Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 became law. Section
794 states in part:
No funds . . . may be obligated or expended for the
procurement of a weapon system unless the prime contractor
or other contractors for such a system provide the United
States with written guarantees. [14:154]
23
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Figure 1. Warranty Cost Benefit Picture
24
Written guarantees now have the following requirements:




The weapon system and its components are to be free
from defects that would cause failure to meet
performance requirements.
3. In the event of failure, the contractor will bear the
cost of achieving required performance. This
particular reform was one of the initial actions of
Congress to direct day to day procurements in DOD.
[15]
DOD and industry complaints of this law ranged from
excessive warranty costs to severe problems of warranty
administration. [16:S15666] The DOD maintained a go slow
approach to implementation. Secretary Taft issued a 90 day
general waiver of the warranty requirement on the basis of
cost effectiveness. The military services needed time to
assess the cost impact of incorporating the requirement into
pending contracts. Waivers could be granted by the Service
secretaries and defense agency directors with the
appropriate authority. The DOD applied the statute as
directed, despite industry protests and heavy public and
Congressional pressure. [16]
With the realities of applying Section 794, the Senate
Armed Services Committee attempted to remedy many of the
problems brought on by the 1984 Act. Some of these problems
included:
1. What did the definition "other defense equipment"
specifically mean? Did this include support equipment
as well as the weapon system itself?
25




Should warranties apply to cost type contracts?
[17:35]
Congress passed the amended warranty legislation as a
part of the 1985 Defense Appropriations Bill. This amended
law revised the 1984 Act in a more workable manner. It
included six significant changes: [18:13]
- The definition of "weapon system" and "component" were
clarified.
- The Secretary or his delegate was given leeway in
deciding on the stated remedies for breach of warranty
unless provided in contract.
- Language was added that clearly authorizes the
negotiation of specific details of a guaranty including
reasonable exclusions, limitations, and duration.
- The Secretary was empowered to reduce the price of any
contract to collect the reasonable costs of corrective
action undertaken by the United States.
- The guaranty requirements apply only to systems that
are in mature full-scale production. This means it
applies to all units after the first one-tenth of the
eventual total production or the initial production
quantity, whichever is less.
- The warranty applied to any design or manufacturing
requirement included in a contract amendment.
With the issue of Government Furnished Equipment, (GFE)
,
the contractor would not be responsible for warranting GFE
within the weapon system he produces. The contractor is
responsible for proper installation of the GFE so as not to
invalidate the warranty provided by the manufacturer of the
GFE to the Government. [17:36] Examples of this are
breaking a warranty seal, losing the associated warranty
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paperwork or marking plate, and installing the GFE
improperly so as to cause it to fail.
The new law, Section 2403 to Title 10 of the United
States Code, directed the DOD to implement warranties on
major weapon systems where warranties proved cost effective.
This was to be determined by applying a life cycle cost
model with and without the warranty. The Department of
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
Subpart 4 6.7 provided direct guidance on implementing
warranties. In applying the above regulations, confusion
arose in DOD over what factors were to be considered in
determining whether a warranty is cost effective. Secretary
Taft provided the following guidance: [16]
1. In order to facilitate the identification of the cost
of the guaranty, the cost of the guaranty shall be set
forth either in the contract or in the contracting
officer's documentation, supporting the negotiations.
2
.
There are other factors which must be considered in
determining whether the guaranty is cost effective
such as any indirect costs to the Government necessary
to maintain the guaranty in effect. (Examples—effect
on breakout and competitive procurement)
To put the above guidance into action, an all-encompas-
sing cost estimate and analysis must be carefully performed.
An inadequate review by the contracting officer may cost the
Government much more than what the warranty actually cost.
The Navy seems to have gone one step further than the
guidance provided by Secretary Taft. As determined in
interviews with key Navy contracting officials, the Navy's
unwritten policy on warranties is that the Navy will simply
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not pay for warranties regardless of cost. [19] In a
competitive environment this would seem easy to do, but in a
sole source position it may prove difficult. The Navy's
position is that getting the contractor to stand behind his
product is a form of an implied warranty and therefore
should not cost extra. The Navy will pay for a design or an
extended period warranty where the cost could be justified.
The current overall DOD policy on warranties,
highlighted in DFAR 46.7702, narrows down three particular
areas in which a prime contractor must provide the
Government with a written warranty for major weapon systems.
These areas include the following: [3:46.7-3]
- Design and manufacturing requirements specifically
delineated in the contract, (or any modification to that
contract)
.
- Free from all defects in materials and workmanship at
the time of acceptance or delivery as specified in the
contract.
- If manufactured in mature full-scale production, conform
to the essential performance requirements as delineated
in the contract, (or any modification to that
contracts)
.
E. MILITARY EXPERIENCE WITH WARRANTIES
As far back as 1968 with Lear Siegler providing
warranties on A4/F4 gyro's to Pratt & Whitney's current
warranty package for the Alternate Fighter Engine (AFE)
program, warranties were applied in DOD. [8:27, 20:65]
Based on a 1979 internal DOD survey, one-third of the 4.1
million types of items in DOD's inventory are covered by
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some type of warranty. A number of studies were conducted
on the actual benefits of warranties but with varied
findings. Three recent uses of warranties indicate
inconclusive results. [21:26]
The Air Force estimated that they saved a billion
dollars in the AFE based largely on improvements in Pratt &
Whitney's F100-220 warranty offer. This estimate was based
over a 20 year life cycle. [22:145] It would be
interesting to investigate how the Air Force came up with
the savings. Did they match savings against costs of
administration of warranties?
The Navy has had mixed results with its recent
application of warranties. With the Phoenix Missile, the
Navy negotiated an unconditional no cost warranty with
Hughes Aircraft Co. covering 265 missiles over a three year
period. [23:98] Could this no cost warranty be the result
of a competitive advantage or the Navy's staunch stand on
not paying for warranties?
With the Tomahawk Cruise Missile program, applying
Congressionally dictated warranty law for missile hardware
cost the Government an additional $340.8 million dollars.
[24:81]
Estimates for both savings and additional costs for the
above programs are "up-front" estimates. It would appear
that any estimates for current warranty applications are
extremely premature. Good or bad, new warranty applications
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are a radical change in doing business. Careful analysis
has to be made because of the numerous variables which have
to be taken into account. Declaring $1.0 billion savings or
$300 million in additional costs from warranties could be no
more than a little political gaming.
Because the Navy currently does not have a data base for
tracking warranties, it is difficult to look at the overall
Navy warranty picture. The only way to obtain these data is
to look at each program individually. Table 2 presents a
sampling of warranties now being developed in the Navy.
F. CONTRACTUAL APPLICATION
This section will briefly highlight key points in apply-
ing warranties for weapon systems from the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation (FAR) Subpart 46.7 and DOD FAR Supplement
(DFARS) Subpart 46.7. Under the FAR, warranties are not
mandatory. If warranties are to be applied, the contracting
officer should consider the following factors: [5:46-9]






5. Reduced requirements (i.e., reducing the Government's
contract quality assurance requirements where the
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AV-8B 2 years 12% 8 months















SH-60F 2 years 2% NTE NA
SH-60B 2 years 4% 6 months
[A - No1t Available NTE - Not to Exceed
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TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
Note 1: These figures reflect an approximation of the
program warranty cost even though warrant cost is
not a separate contract line item cost.
Source: Interviewee, Naval Air Systems Command
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The FAR presents five contract clauses and alternates
which may be modified when warranty coverage is appropriate.
These clauses include: [5:46-11]
1. Warranty of Supplies of a Noncomplex Nature, FAR
52.246-17




Warranty of Systems and Equipment under Performance or
Design Criteria, FAR 52.246-19
4. Warranty of Services, FAR 52.246-20
5. Warranty of Construction, FAR 52.246-21
While warranty application may be similar, weapon system
warranties under DFARS differ from those under the FAR in
two important areas:
1. DOD weapon systems warranties are mandatory unless: a
waiver is granted, the contract is a cost-reimburse-
ment type contract, or the unit cost or total
procurement cost does not meet the statutory
requirements. [3:46.7-2]
2. As a departure from the FAR, the contractor is
required to provide warranties on weapon systems he
designed and also weapon systems designed or
controlled by the Government, if the warranty coverage
is cost effective. [4:2]
Contracting Officers in the DOD entering into contracts
for the production of a weapon system with a unit weapon
system cost of more than $100,000, or the eventual total
procurement is in excess of $10,000,000, must include the
following warranties:
- Design and Manufacturing
- Materials and Workmanship
- Essential Performance Requirements
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Any or all of the above warranties may be waived if the
waiver is "in the interests of national defense or if the
warranty is not cost effective." [3:46.7-3] Although not a
part of this research, it would be interesting to determine
how many waivers have been submitted for complete weapon
systems or for a particular type of a warranty.
DFARS emphasizes that warranty terms and conditions
should be tailored for each application. Chapter IV will
show how this tailoring is practiced by comparing different
warranty clauses as a case study.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
As a backdrop for further discussion on weapon system
warranty law implementation, this chapter has presented an
explanation of warranties. Primarily, it is a mechanism for
shifting risk to the seller for ensuring product quality.
With problems of weapon system quality occurring more
frequently, Congress directed the DOD to employ warranty
coverage where cost-effective. Although the warranty
business is not new to DOD, applying it within the context
of the new laws was a significant change in its contracting
business. The benefits to be gained from employing
warranties are numerous, but there are many pitfalls which
stand in the way of success for any particular weapon system
program.
Chapter III will present how each Service implemented
the new warranty laws through Service directives as of 1
34
July 1986. The focus of Chapter III will show what the Navy
has done through its Systems Commands.
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III. WARRANTY LAW IMPLEMENTATION
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief
overview of warranty procedures as implemented by Air Force,
Army, and Navy regulations. Differences between Service
regulations are presented in a chart type format. Analysis
is concentrated on the Navy draft implementing instruction,
SECNAVINST 433 0. XX. Discussion continues regarding Navy
procedures for implementation flow down through the Navy
Systems Commands.
B. SERVICE IMPLEMENTATION
Each Service has a varied background concerning past
warranty use. The Air Force was heavily involved with
reliability improvement warranties in the early 1970's. The
Army has used extensive warranty coverage on vehicles and
airframes. The Navy has applied warranties primarily in
their airframe and shipbuilding concerns.
With this different warranty experience, each Service
implemented or is in the process of implementing Section
2403 of Title 10, United States Code in a different manner.
This section will either present a synopsis of those




The Air Force developed their Warranty
Implementation Plan through a two-step process. Major
Command maintenance and supply personnel were solicited to
provide critical warranty administration problems. Using
that input, a joint Air Force Logistics Command and Air
Force System Command workgroup was then established to
formulate the plan. [25:2]
The Air Force Warranty Administration Plan was
implemented on 11 April 1986 and approved by Lieutenant
General Leo Marquez, USAF. The purpose of the plan is as
follows:
To establish a system for acquisition and logistics
organizations to track and administer fielded systems and
equipment covered by contractual warranties, and to
provide feedback to the contracting community on the
feasibility of specific warranty items. [26:1]
The plan provides some historical Air Force
background on warranty use along with emphasis on the
establishment of the Product Performance Agreement Center.
The requirements of the new warranty law are briefly
explained. Terms used throuqhout the instruction are also
described. Two significant terms should be noted—"Warranty
Manager" and "Warranty Plan."
The warranty manager is the office accountable and
responsible for all warranty related activities. His duties
range from providing disposition instructions to monitoring
contractor performance. This warranty manager provides a
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single face to the customer and contractor concerning
warranty matters. [26:4-5]
The warranty plan is a document within the program
management sphere which outlines key facets of warranty
coverage for a particular weapon system. It is recommended
that the warranty plan be "completed and coordinated" before
the release of the Request for Proposal, but no definitive
requirement exists for it to be in place. [26:5]
The Warranty Administration Plan outlines five major
objectives to be accomplished: [26:20-22]
Objective 1—Establish an Interim Warranty Administration
System (Near Term)
Objective 2—Automate the Administration Process (Long
Term)
Objective 3—Establish Policy Requirements
Objective 4—Establish a Training Program
Objective 5—Develop Packaging, Handling, and
Transportation
Objective 1 discusses manual interim procedures for
managing warranties. Actions included are marking,
tracking, reporting, disposition and material accountabili-
ty. Major points within this objective include: [26:7-8]
- Markings as of MIL-STD-129 and 130.
- Use of issue exception code B when issuing items from
the supply system.
- Warranty duration expressed as calendar days is
recommended. If not, the use of an elapsed time
indicator should be considered.
- Consideration in warranty duration concerning
transportation, storage and redistribution activities.
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- Field Level procedures for warranty management.
- System level maintenance orders including an alert to
users that the system may be under warranty.
- Disposition instructions.
- Accountability of a returned warranted item is held
jointly by the warranty manager and the cognizant
Contract Administration Office.
- Warranty manager tasked with monitoring contractor
performance of warranty items.
The above interim warranty administration procedures
have an implementation date of 1 April 1987. Figure 2,
presents a picture of the intended field level procedures.
Objective 2 highlights the fact that to be effective
and efficient a warranty administration program must be
automated. The use of bar coding is also being considered.
Expected implementation of an automated program is in the
1988-1990 time frame. [26:9]
Objectives 3, 4, and 5 are broad strokes of policy
requirements. Objective 3 describes regulation and
publication updates; Objective 4 describes training program
development; Objective 5 defines particular areas of
packaging, handling, and transportation which must be
addressed in future procedures. [26:9]
The Air Force Warranty Administration Plan presents
general policy requirements of what should be accomplished
in warranty administration. Specific milestones are
identified for those requirements. The appointment of a





















































































appear as key ingredients for the successful application of
warranty coverage. The emphasis on coordination between the
warranty manager and the Contract Administration Office is
another important factor. This Warranty Administration Plan
in a sense lays the foundation for further implementation
actions. It directs implementation procedures to be in
place in the future.
2 . Army
Of the three Services, the Army has the most
definitive, published set of warranty procedures to date.
Army Regulation AR 700-139, effective 10 April 1986, lays
out step-by-step procedures on Army management of




CH3 Statutory and Regulatory Requirements
CH4 Warranty Acquisition Policy and Procedures
CH5 Warranty Information
CH6 Warranty Fielding and Execution
CH7 Compliance
Also included is an internal control review checklist for
use in cost-effectiveness analysis and payoff assessment.
The following discussion attempts to highlight major points
in each chapter.
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The purpose of the regulation is identified in
Chapter One. Warranty coverage is applied to both centrally
procured and locally procured items. Centrally procured
items are complex, durable, and expensive equipment
generally used Army-wide. (For example, MIA Tank or a
Blackhawk helicopter) . Locally procured items are
consumable in nature and used at the organization level.
(For example, office supplies or small general use hand
tools). [27:3]
Chapter Two defines specific responsibilities for
warranty management. Waiver authority for warranty coverage
by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Develop-
ment, and Acquisition) is explained. The Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, (similar to the Commander, Naval Supply
Systems Command) , has Army Staff responsibility for the
Army's Warranty Program. The Material Developer (similar to
the Navy Hardware Systems Commands) , is the prime
implementor and acquisition authority for warranty coverage.
They must ensure that warranty coverage can be carried out
within the Integrated Logistics Support Plan of a major
weapon system development program. A warranty control
office/officer (WARCO) is established at each Major Command
as a point of contact once the weapon system is deployed.
The WARCO performs a number of duties. These include
coordinating with the Material Developer concerning warranty
execution procedures and informing various activities of
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warranty coverage through warranty technical bulletins.
[27:3-4]
The statutory and regulatory requirements concerning
warranty coverage are outlined in Chapter Three. This
section makes particular note of program management warranty
documentation. Army review process within a weapon system
development program, including review by the Army System
Acquisition Review Council, must entail warranty
considerations. [27:4]
The primary emphasis of Chapter Four is that each
warranty must be tailored to fit the particular equipment
with "minimal impact on standard Army logistics procedures."
[27:4]
The Army narrows warranties to two basic concepts:
Expected Failure Concept and the Failure Free Concept. The
Expected Failure Concept acknowledges that any design will
include some failures. Any failure above a certain level
initiates a warranty claim. The Army in effect terms this
concept "systemic defect coverage." If warranty provisions
do not include individual item warranties, the failure level
is determined through various field reports, such as a
Quality Deficiency Report. Under the Failure Free Concept
any individual item failure within a given time period
requires claim actions. [27:5]
Before any weapon system procurement, the Army
requires a formal cost effectiveness analysis as obligated
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by regulation. In addition, "warranty assessments" are made
throughout the warranty coverage period to further evaluate
whether the warranty benefits do indeed outweigh the costs.
Any warranty managed by the Army must include
provisions for warranty repairs by the Army. The only
remedy authorized for this action is a contract refund or
reduction for expenses incurred including transportation.
Specific cost elements for refund calculation are presented.
[27:6]
Warranty duration is determined by two factors:
average elapsed time factor and an operational use factor:
The average elapsed time factor is the period of time
which occurs from the time of contract delivery until the
item is placed in operation. (This includes all normal
delays) . The operational use factor is the period of time
in actual operation that will prove the substantive
quality of the item and the integrity of the manufacturing
process. This period should be between 10 and 25 percent
of the expected life and generally not less than 1
calendar year or 1 year of an equivalent usage rate in
whatever units are best measured. [27:6]
If there is any instance in which the equipment will not
become operational (example - War Reserve Material)
,
the
contract price is adjusted in a manner similar to repair
refunds, described in the previous paragraph. [27:7]
Warranty marking is laid out in specific detail. In
addition to the standard MIL-STD-130 requirements the
following minimum information must be included:
"WARRANTY ITEM"
"WTB XXXXX" (Unique number)
"EXPIRES XX/XX" (Unique date/rate)
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Bar coding of this information is recommended, but currently
not required. Any shipping and release documents, such as a
DD1348-1, must have information identifying the warranty in
the remarks section. [27:7]
A central collection agency is designated for
managing a warranty data base. Detailed data elements are
highlighted. The information in the data base is shared by
both the Material Developers and the Major Commands for
analyzing warranties. This data base allows for a
twenty-four hour query response on specific warranty data
requests. The central collection agency also publishes
various warranty related reports and informational listings
such as a WARCO address and indices of warranty items.
[27:8]
Chapters six and seven describe warranty fielding,
execution and compliance procedures. These procedures must
be implemented in such a manner that the item is supported
in the same manner during the warranty coverage and after
warranty expiration. This involves Army logistical support
systems, uniform administrative procedures, and user
visibility. [27:8]
In summary, AR 700-139 stipulates explicit
procedures for warranty management. These procedures are
published and in place. The regulation emphasizes tailored
warranty coverage for maximum cost effectiveness. The
coverage must be user friendly if required or invisible to
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the field level user. Responsibility is centered on
specific activities. Information is available through
warranty technical bulletins and the central collection
agency for effective management. A mechanism is provided
through warranty assessment procedures for ensuring that the
warranty is doing what it is supposed to and that the
warranty is truly cost effective. These procedures appear
detailed enough to provide consistency from the Army Staff
down to the user level. The Army warranty system is
characterized by centralized authority and responsibility.
3. Navy
In September 1985, the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) , ASN (S&L) , established a
Navy Warranty Ad Hoc Group from representatives of the Navy
Systems Commands. This group was assigned to do the
following: [28]
- Establish essential performance requirements criteria.
- Establish procedures for warranty field
administration
.
- Determine contractual requirements to be placed on
contractors, i.e. segregation of historical warranty
cost data.
The ASN (S&L) office was specifically tasked to develop
overall Navy policy on administration of warranties in the
field.
In late November 1985, the first draft of proposed
SECNAVINST 433 0. XX, Navy Warranty Program, was submitted to
appropriate Navy Commands for review and comment. The most
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significant feedback on the proposed instruction centered on
the requirement that "warranties should generally be
obtained at no additional cost to the Navy." Five of the
activities responding highlighted an apparent inconsistency.
Although the proposed instruction required "no cost"
warranties, it also specified identification of any price
that is paid for a warranty. Navy upper management
unofficial policy was that the Navy should not have to pay
an additional amount of money for a particular level of
quality that the contractor should be providing in the first
place. The warranty cost statement was eventually revised
in further drafts. [29:8]
This treatment of warranty cost and associated risk
to the contractor are the prime stumbling blocks in
publishing an official Navy policy on warranties. The
following review will concentrate on the draft SECNAVINST
4330. XX as it stood on 1 July 1986.
The purpose of SECNAVINST 4 3 30. XX is to provide
overall Navy policy relating to warranty requirements of the
new warranty law and DFARS Subpart 46.7. These regulation
requirements are briefly outlined and reiterated. The
following major points of the requirements section of the
instruction are summarized below: [29]
a. Emphasis is placed on warranty cost effectiveness by
performing a formal cost benefit analysis and
including it in the contract file. A Navy Warranty
Cost-Benefit Analysis Policy Guide is included as an
enclosure to the instruction.
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b. Essential performance requirements are defined and
addressed. The key to essential performance
requirements in warranty development is that they must
be "measurable and verifiable by the contractor and
the Government." Auditable records relating to
warranty risk/cost comparisons are to be maintained.
The first contract for mature full-scale production
must document essential performance requirements.
Acquisition plans for major weapon systems must
include warranty strategy.
c. Warranted items must be marked with this minimum
information:
- Item identification number or part number
- Contract number
- "Indication" warranty applies
- Manufacturer
- Warranty expiration date
- Notification of what actions void warranty
d. Navy Systems Commands are to develop some type of
warranty information system for notification of
warranty failures, disposition instructions, and a
failed unit return system. The main method of
carrying out the above actions is through the Quality
Deficiency Report system (SF368) . It is stressed that
warranties should not be "burdensome" to Navy and
Marine users. Within this warranty information
system, undetermined warranty administration points of
contact are to collect the following types of warranty
data:
- numbers of replacement/repairs.
- numbers and dollar value of claims made.
- numbers and dollar value of claims successfully
recovered.
The above data and also contract clauses and
solicitations for warranties shall be provided to the
Joint Service Data Base, Product Performance Agreement
Center (PPAC) , at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.
Requests for assistance from PPAC in warranty use and
development are encouraged.
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e. Warranty duration is defined as being of a
"reasonable" length. The type of defects and failure
that may occur and also possible storage time should
be examined.
The next section of SECNAVINST 4330. XX discusses
implementation by the Hardware Systems Commands. Basically,
it is restatement on how the previous section warranty
requirements are to be dealt with contractually. The many
types of data required from the contractor for warranty
administration are specified. The following elements must
be in each warranty section of a major weapon system
contract:
- Warranty requirements covering:
1) Conformance to design and manufacturing
requirements
2) Freedom from defects in materials and
workmanship
3) Conformance to essential performance requirements
- Associated warranty cost data





- Government repair option
This section also directs the establishment of
warranty administration points of contact with additional
elements of warranty information to be maintained. These
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points of contact are not defined to any particular
activity. [29]
The proposed SECNAVINST 43 3 0. XX presents a broad
policy framework for Navy warranty management. It allows
for liberal interpretation of implementation requirements,
particularly in the area of a warranty management
information system. This instruction, like those of the Air
Force and Army, maintains an accent on cost effectiveness
and user visibility.
C. COMPARISON OF SERVICES REGULATIONS
1. Differences
This section will present an examination of Air
Force, Army and Navy warranty procedures. This is
accomplished by identifying major warranty issues and
presenting how each Service regulation accommodated those
issues. Table 3 displays a more readable format to make
these comparisons.
The following is a brief discussion on the Service
treatment of various warranty issues outlined in Table 3.
a. Overall Policy Responsibility
The Air Force and Army assign military positions
the duty of providing warranty policy guidance. The Navy
maintains civilian leadership for this policy at a different
organizational level. Because of the organization
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b. Warranty System Responsibility
Each Service essentially retains this
responsibility with the organization producing and
developing the weapon system. This facilitates program
management review and responsibility for the weapon system.
c. Warranty Types Defined
Although using different terminology, the Air
Force and Army align warranties into two categories: 1) An
individual piece of equipment warranty, and 2) An overall
system warranty. The Navy delineates warranties within the
context of the definitions provided in the warranty
legislation.
d. Operational Review of Warranty Effectiveness
Each Service maintains somewhat different review
procedures. While the Air Force and Army lay out specific
procedures and elements for review, the Navy only provides
for summarized reports to the policy organization. The
researcher observes that it is necessary to establish a
systematic and routine review procedure for evaluating
warranty effectiveness.
e. Warranty Management Information System
One of the primary keys to warranty management
is a comprehensive management information system (MIS) . The
Services have not fully developed their warranty MIS. The
Air Force and Army are in the process of laying the
groundwork for this. The Air Force has established PPAC.
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The Army has been providing warranty technical bulletins,
warranty indexes, and maintaining a database. The Navy
directs the Systems Commands to develope warranty MIS.
f. Warranty Claim Reporting or Claim Format
Maintenance directives outline these
requirements in Air Force and Army. Navy supply manuals
(for example—NAVSUP P-485, Afloat Supply Procedures QDR
system) describe reporting requirements.
g. Failed Unit Return System
The Navy has yet to publish procedures for their
failed unit return system. The Army's method appears as the
least disruptive to standard procedures. This promotes ease
of handling at the user level.
h. Documentation Requirements in Weapon System
Development Plans
The Acquisition Plan is the common element
between Services for incorporating warranties in program
documentation. The Army additionally requires documentation
in the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) . This is a
rational decision because of the effect warranties have on
developing a maintenance plan. The maintenance plan is a
major design and cost driver in the ILSP.
i. Cost/Benefit Analysis
Each Service requires a warranty cost/benefit
analysis either included in the warranty plan or contract
file. The Navy has gone one step further by including a
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warranty cost/benefit outline and guidance document with
SECNAVINST 43 30. XX.
j . Problem Resolution Mechanism
Warranty coverage is a sharp change in the
business manner of developing and acquiring weapon systems.
Questions are bound to arise with both contracting personnel
and the field level user. The Air Force and Army have
procedures or organizations in place to handle problems.
This area was not addressed in the Navy implementing
instructions. Long range degradation of warranty
effectiveness may result because of this.
k. Essential Performance Requirements
The literature reviewed for this study
emphasized the defining essential performance requirements
in developing warranties. The Navy has created extensive
procedures for ensuring the emphasis is not minimized. The
Air Force and Army briefly touch on this topic in their
implementing instructions.
1 . Marking
Each Service requires various warranty elements
to be included in warranty marking labels. There is little
consistency between Services. The Army requirements of
warranty marking, shipping and release documentation and
computer program visual displays should be adopted by both
the Air Force and Navy.
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m. Turnaround Time (TAT)
Within each Service procedures, TAT is defined
and contractually required. The Air Force and Army
underscore the importance of dependable TAT by either
ensuring TAT is "guaranteed" or not any less responsive than
normal maintenance methods.
n. Repair/Corrective Action Responsibilities and
Remedies
The Services include various remedy options
within their implementing instructions. The Army directs
that it must always include the option for Army repair. In
calculating costs for the equitable adjustment option, the
Army provides specific cost elements to be used for
continuity.
o. Duration
The concepts used for determining warranty
duration appear different between Services. The Air Force's
idea of fixing duration "no longer than requires to identify
defects . . ." differs from the Army and Navy. The Army
quantifies percentages of expected weapon system life. The
Navy, which as shown in the next chapter, generally goes
with a standard time frame. All Services highlight storage
considerations in warranty duration.
p. Tracking
As with previous warranty issues, the Army lays
out detailed procedures for handling tracking. The Air
Force only defines tracking. The Navy procedures make
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reference to the Quality Deficiency Reporting System, but
leaves the specifics to the Systems Commands.
2 . Analysis
As illustrated in the preceding section, each
Service approached major warranty issues with largely
different wording. As opposed to the Army's and Air
Forces' s centralized responsibility and detailed procedures
of warranty management, the Navy has left many of the
specifics to the Systems Commands for implementation. The
following issues highlight the analysis of those Navy
implementation procedures with Air Force and Army procedures
as background.
a. Marine Corps Involvement
Although the Marine Corps looks at itself as
being separated from the Navy, they share many of the same
logistics channels and procedures. SECNAVINST 43 30. XX tasks
the Marine Corps with developing their own policies and
procedures for processing warranty claims. Not all Marine
Corps equipment is procured through strictly Marine Corps
procurement activities. The Navy Plant Representative
Offices often provide contract administration functions.
Why not standardize the claims procedures between the Navy
and Marine Corps for ease of processing? Which claims
procedures does a Marine Corp activity use with equipment
procured jointly with the Army?
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b. Cost-Benefit Analysis
How do you perform a cost-benefit analysis when
the unofficial Navy policy is that warranties should not
cost extra? The Navy Warranty Cost-Benefit Analysis Policy
Guide provides only general elements to follow. It also
states that various checklists and computer procedures have
been developed for assistance. Navy Systems Command people
interviewed knew little, if anything, of any cost-benefit
model or computer systems available. With few knowing how
to perform a cost-benefit analysis, it is either not being
done at all or only being performed in a cursory manner, as
can be expected.
c. Joint Service Data Base, Product Performance
Agreement Center (PPAC)
Warranty use and claim data, contract clauses
and solicitations are required to be provided to PPAC. As
of July 198 6 no data have been provided to PPAC by the Navy.
Only the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) has contacted or
investigated the use of PPAC. The idea of a Joint Service
Data Base sounds fine in theory, but in reality it may prove
difficult to use, primarily because of location. This could
also be why the three Services have not completed an
agreement as to funding PPAC as a Joint Service Activity.
This researcher observes that the Navy might be better off
concentrating its efforts in developing their own warranty
expertise points of contact and data base.
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d. Marking
The instruction provides minimum data elements
for marking. To avoid confusion at the user level and make
the user more aware of a warranted item, a standardized
format similar to what the Army has done may be more
conducive for processing. The maintenance man only has to
know one format. A question arises on joint Service
procurement programs. Which Service marking procedures do
you use? A new military standard covering all three
Services for warranty marking could reduce problems.
e. Customer/user notification system
From the instruction it is not clear whether or
not each Systems Command is to develop their own system.
One could only imagine the problems for a maintenance
activity having to deal with three or more different
reporting systems. It would appear to be more effective to
develop one reporting system which crosses Command lines.
The use of a SF368 (Quality Deficiency Report) is only the
first step of the system. Although the instruction
emphasizes that warranties should not be "burdensome" to the
Fleet, it does require additional management controls to be
implemented at the user level.
f. Warranty Administration Points of Contact (POC)
These warranty POC's are mentioned throughout
the instruction. The Systems Commands are tasked with
establishing these Warranty POC's at Navy activities as
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appropriate. Does this allow the Systems Commands to push
warranty management responsibility further down the chain of
command? What defines a Navy activity as appropriate?
Because the warranty POC's hold a key position in overall
Navy administration of warranties, it would seem to be
more effective, from a management point of view, to be more
precise in establishing the warranty POC's. The user could
be faced with a hodgepodge of warranty activities when
trying to resolve a problem.
g. Warranty Effectiveness
A front end analysis is required to determine
warranty cost effectiveness, but there is no established
mechanism evaluating warranty effectiveness once the
warranty is "operational." The data for assessment are
required contractually, and summarized reports are forwarded
ASN (S&L) . Is this enough to ensure a routine appraisal of
a particular warranty program? The instruction directs
management controls to ensure that the user carries out
proper warranty procedures. Why not institute some type of
control to ensure an effectiveness review is enacted?
h. Program Planning Documentation
Acquisition plans must now address the planned
use of warranties. When questioned regarding the existence
of provisions for warranties in acquisition plans,
interviewees at the Systems Commands responded that a
warranty is called for in the plan but no further
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elaboration of its features are identified. Incorporating a
warranty plan in the Integrated Logistics Support Plan
(ILSP) early on in program development, forces a more
thorough review. The maintenance planning concept coming
out of the ILSP is made more realistic through warranty
considerations
.
i. The following minor points are highlighted:
1) How do maintenance regulations, such as the Preventive
Maintenance System incorporate warranties?
2) What cost elements are involved with contract
adjustments of the Government options to repair the
warranted item? Should this repair option be
mandatory to support readiness?
3) Are Navy activities being provided additional funding
to cover warranty administration functions? For
example, in a receiving activity such as Naval Supply
Center, Norfolk, are work measurement computations to
be adjusted to incorporate the added function of
verifying warranty applicability to repairables?
In summary it has been over eighteen months
since the revised warranty legislation was passed by
Congress. The Systems Commands have been warranting weapon
systems as required by law, but the Navy has not yet
initiated policy concerning implementing procedures. In
effect, the Hardware Systems Commands keep pumping out
warranted equipment, but the procedures for managing the
warranties are not in place. The draft instruction,
SECNAVINST 4330. XX, will establish those procedures for the
Systems Commands to implement. From this researcher's view,
those general procedures should be made in detail. With
each Systems Command left to its own implementation, the
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user in the field may be faced with a variety of procedures
for warranty management. The impact of warranties at the
Fleet level is far too great to add additional confusion
with different procedures. Why not publish SECNAVINST
4330. XX without its controversial parts, so that at least
the Systems Commands have a basis upon which to work? The
instruction could be amended later to accommodate any policy
initiative changes.
D. NAVY SYSTEMS COMMAND IMPLEMENTATION
As each Service has approached warranty implementation
differently, each Navy Systems Command, in meeting the
requirements of the law, has used different methods in
accomplishing warranty management. This section will look
at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) , Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) , Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
(SPAWAR) , and the Naval Supply Systems Commands (NAVSUP)
actions of implementation as a logical progression from
SECNAVINST 4330. XX, which was outlined in the preceding
section.
1. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
In implementing the new warranty legislation NAVSEA
02, (Contracts), and the NAVSEA legal counsel generated two
new generic warranty contract clauses as models for
compliance to the legislation. These contract clauses are
titled the "NAVSEA Standard Shipbuilding Warranty Clause"
and the "NAVSEA Baseline Weapon System Clause." A tailored
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version of these warranty clauses is included in every major
weapon system contract let by NAVSEA. Each acquisition plan
must address the planned use of warranties and is verified
through NAVSEA 90, (Acquisition Planning and Appraisal).
Figure 3 is a summarized check list developed by NAVSEA
which identifies the "theoretical" items that should be
included in each NAVSEA warranty contract clause.






b. Exceptions and Conditions
4. Marking
5. Contractor Obligations
a. Contractor's Warranty Coverage
b. Third Party Clause







e. Contractor's Rights to Remedies




a. Government Furnished Property
b. Foreign Military Sales
c. Second Source Clause




Figure 3. NAVSEA Warranty Checklist
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In July 1985, NAVSEA 90 published a warranty guide
entitled, "NAVSEA ACQUISITION PROGRAM CONTRACT WARRANTY
GUIDE", for use by contracting and technical personnel. The
Guide is outlined in six sections: [31]
Section I: Basic Definitions and Requirements
Section II: Contract and Warranties
Section III: Costs and Cost/Benefit Analysis
Section IV: Waivers
Section V: Examples of Warranties
Section VI: Administration of Warranties
Each section is further broken down into a question and
answer type format. The questions are general in nature
with supplemental information and examples provided with the
answers. The Guide is an excellent desk top reference, but
cannot supplant formal procedures.
In March 1986, NAVSEA issued a contract to
Techmatics, Inc. to perform a two year study in developing a
warranty management information system. This system will be
designed to provide the following capabilities: [30]
- identify, track, administer, and execute warranty
provisions in NAVSEA contracts.
- evaluate the cost benefits and technical worth
of warranty provisions over the life of warranties.
- to make judgments and decisions regarding well or
poorly structured warranty provisions based on
experience data.
Once implemented, this system should provide
excellent visibility of all NAVSEA warranties. Currently,
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there is no way to identify individual warranties short of
going to the specific program or contract file.
NAVSEA is waiting for SECNAVINST 43 3 0. XX to be
published before issuing any detailed NAVSEA instructions on
warranties. The only necessity now is to ensure that
contract clauses meet the requirements of DFARS Subpart
4 6.7. The shipbuilding business of NAVSEA has felt minimal
impact on their warranty management.
2 . Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
NAVAIR's theme throughout its warranty management
plans and policies is to ensure the contractor "stands
behind his product" and that this responsibility follows the
product down to the user level. [32:2-6] This quality
responsibility theme extends back ten years to the use of
material and workmanship warranties used on aircraft
engines. In 1982 performance requirements were also added
to engine warranties. These performance warranties included
the TF30 Low Cycle Fatigue Life warranty and the F4 04
performance specification warranty. [33]
Within the aircraft engine world, NAVAIR was a key
contributor to the publication in 1984 of a Joint Engine
Warranty Development Guide (For Military Aircraft Turbine
Engines) . This guide presents a comprehensive reference in
applying engine warranties. [2]
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Although NAVAIR maintained considerable experience
with warranties by 1985, problems in warranty management
persisted. These problems included: [33]
- Lack of overall organizational procedures and
measures of warranty effectiveness.
- Inadequate internal communication on warranties.
- Training and publications not incorporating warranty
use and development.
These problems led to increased dependency on the contractor
which invariably reduced the effectiveness of the warranty.
[33]
Similar to the NAVSEA Warranty Guide, NAVAIR 05
published a "NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND GUIDELINES FOR
APPLICATION OF WEAPON SYSTEM PROCUREMENT WARRANTIES" in July
1985. Unlike the NAVSEA Warranty Guide, the NAVAIR Warranty
Guide is much more detailed. It lays out specific
requirements from warranty planning and evaluation factors
to sample warranty clauses and contract terms. Like the
NAVSEA Warranty Guide, the NAVAIR Warranty Guide is only a
reference publication and not an authoritative document.
In December 1985 NAVAIR became the first Systems
Command to publish an official instruction, NAVAIRINST
13 07 0.7, which addresses the new warranty legislation. The
instruction outlines overall NAVAIR policy in complying with
warranty requirements. It stipulates areas of
responsibilities for warranty management within NAVAIR,
NAVAIR Field Activities and Inventory Control Points and
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also the Naval Aviation Logistics Center. For example, the
instruction directs NAVAIR 04 to "establish an effective
Fleet data feedback system to support NAVAIR warranty
administration, " but the instruction does not mandate when
this action should be done or how it should be done. [34]
In developing warranty marking requirements NAVAIR
solicited inputs from the Fleet, Naval Plant Representative
Offices, and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) . The
following elements are required as minimum: [35]
- "WARRANTED ITEM"
- Contract number of procurement
- Warranty expiration date
- Where to ship the item while under warranty
The procedures differentiate marking requirements between
contractor furnished equipment and Government furnished
equipment. The procedures also delineate what items to
mark. For example, designated repairables which can be
replaced at the organizational level of maintenance should
be marked individually. Major end items such as aircraft
must have warranty provisions documented in the
Miscellaneous History Record (OPNAV 4790/2 5A)
.
In developing a warranty reporting system and
problem resolution mechanism, NAVAIR is investigating two
techniques: (1) A closed loop Quality Deficiency Report
(QDR—SF3 68) System and (2) Use of contract Warranty
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Assessment Boards made up of members from the contractor and
NAVAIR.
The Quality Deficiency Report (QDR) System involves
warranty violations which do not require corrective action
on a one-for-one basis. This approach is similar to the
Army's method of managing warranties through system wide
failure trends. It involves the following steps: [36]
- All warranted items: warranty cost and disposition
information provided in QDR.
- Maintain active data for QDR warranted items.
- Monthly warranty efficiency reporting.
- Warranty item list and warranty provisions
reporting.
Warranty Assessment Boards have been established
contractually for the HARM and Sparrow missile programs.
These Warranty Assessment Boards are made up of technical
and contracting personnel from the Government and the
contractors. The Boards are required to meet quarterly to
review field operational data for each particular program to
determine compliance or corrective actions associated with
the warranty clause of the contract. The Sparrow Warranty
Assessment Board has been used sparingly, but the HARM
Warranty Assessment Board, established in December 1984, has
had considerable involvement.
3 . Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command fSPAWAR)
SPAWAR's approach in implementing the new warranty
is similar to that of NAVAIR and NAVSEA with the development
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of generic warranty clauses. Professional seminars for
educating SPAWAR personnel on the implications of warranties
have been enacted. Unlike NAVAIR and NAVSEA, SPAWAR has
made no concentrated effort in generating written interim
warranty procedures or warranty guides. SPAWAR has chosen
to wait for the publication of SECNAVINST 4330. XX before
publishing any formal instructions. This could be
attributable to the types of equipment SPAWAR buys and the
dollar amounts involved as compared to NAVAIR and NAVSEA.
In investigating various warranty concepts, SPAWAR has
sponsored theoretical research on commercial warranties in
the electronics industry for possible military applications.
4. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP)
It could be argued that NAVSUP does not purchase
major weapon systems within the context of the new warranty
legislation. Instead, NAVSUP purchases subassemblies or
particular components such as pump motors, valves or circuit
cards. It has been NAVSUP policy that the other Systems
Commands advise NAVSUP when it buys equipment requiring
warranty coverage for the Systems Commands. [37]
The Aviation Supply Office, (ASO) , with its past
experience in obtaining supply warranties on aviation parts,
was tasked in July 1985 to develop recommended NAVSUP policy
on warranties. [37]
The following points outline key issues on the draft
NAVSUP Instruction 4330. XX as it stood June 1986. [38]
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- Definition of NAVSUP, Inventory Control Point, (ICP)
Hardware Systems Command, and Field Level
responsibilities in warranties.
- Establishment of a Warranty Manager at NAVSUP, ICP's
and Navy Supply Centers.
- Emphasis on coordination with Hardware Systems
Commands in maintaining warranty requirements on
equipment supported by the ICP's.
- Establishment of warranty acquisition and administrative
procedures by ICP's.
- Direction to the Hardware Systems Commands to
establish warranty management information systems.
Specific data elements are also described.
- Warranty requirements must operate standard Navy
logistics functions including storage, replacement
part support, and disposal/retrograde return system.
Enclosures to NAVSUP Instruction 4 3 30. XX present general
supply support requirements which have not been fully
developed. These requirements appear to be modeled after
Army warranty procedures. Not yet mentioned in the
instruction is how warranties will affect supply systems
inventory models.
E. ANALYSIS OF SYSTEMS COMMAND IMPLEMENTATION
Each Systems Command has gone in different directions in
implementing new warranty requirements. This seemingly
uncoordinated approach is characteristic of what the
Services also have accomplished as described in previous
sections. Redundancy in Systems Commands' actions waste
assets. An example of this is the establishment of possibly
three different warranty management information systems. If
SECNAVINST 4330. XX was published and was more definitive in
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requirements, these problems might not appear. If the
Navy's warranty procedures are not to be "burdensome" to the
Fleet, the Systems Commands must integrate their warranty
management procedures to present a "single face" to the
user.
Many of the people interviewed during this research were
working on warranty procedures as a collateral duty. This
may account for the long length of time the warranty
procedures are in development. Establishing a dedicated
staff to warranty management may spur warranty management
development. The Army has over a hundred people assigned at
the Staff level totally dedicated to warranty control.
Of the Systems Commands procedures or implementation
efforts reviewed, none took into consideration the
additional workload involved with warranty administration.
For example, if the QDR system is used for reporting
warranties, what will be the impact at contract
administration offices?
The warranty assessment boards provided for in the HARM
and Sparrow contracts appear an excellent means for
resolving warranty problems between the Government and
contractor. Can a Systems Command afford to have a warranty
assessment board for every major weapon system it buys?
What warranty problem resolution mechanism is afforded to
the Fleet user? Fleet maintenance activities operate on a
twenty four hour a day basis around the world, and timely
72
response to problems is required to sustain readiness. If a
warranty problem solution avenue is not open to maintenance
personnel, the chances increase that the warranty may be
voided.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter summarizes warranty implementation proce-
dures of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. Differences between
the Service procedures were described. Analysis concen-
trated on the Navy draft procedures. Discussion then moved
on to Navy Systems Command implementation efforts. These
actions ranged from a wait-and-see attitude by SPAWAR, to
NAVAIR's in-depth warranty guide and warranty assessment
boards. Systems Commands' efforts appear uncoordinated
between each other. Warranty management cuts across Command
lines. To be integrated, warranty management procedures
need to be directed from above. An uncoordinated approach
will ultimately be a burden on the Fleet. Readiness may
suffer and any benefits gained from warranties may be lost.
Chapter IV presents in a case study format the
compilation of warranty clauses, as the result of the
warranty management actions of a Navy Systems Command.
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IV. KEY ISSUES IN NAVY WARRANTY CONTRACT CLAUSES
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
Using a modified case study approach, this chapter shows
how various elements of a warranty contract clause are put
together under the guidance of Service implementation
procedures brought out in Chapter III. This modified case
study approach involves a comparative analysis between the
contract elements of five warranty contract clauses. The
primary purpose of the chapter is to underscore the
important variables or factors of a warranty contract clause
as analyzed through the case study format. Contract clauses
are used from the following programs: HARM, SPARROW,
SIDEWINDER, TOMAHAWK, and a commercial warranty for
communications spacecraft from Hughes Aircraft Company.
These particular programs were chosen, based on
recommendations received from contracting and technical
people familiar with warranty coverage. The communications
spacecraft warranty is included to demonstrate what a
commercial warranty looks like. It is equipment similar to
missiles, in that once it is launched it is seldom
recovered.
B. PROGRAM BACKGROUND
The following is a brief description of each program.
This information is presented to illustrate the maturity of
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the program, complexity of the equipment, and contractors
involved.
1. HARM (AGM-8 8)
The HARM missile is a high-speed, anti-radiation
missile. This air-to-ground missile is used against land
and sea-based radar emitters from enemy radar. It proved
very successful in the Libyan air strike in April 1986. The
HARM is now used with Navy A-7E, F/A 18A and Air Force F-4G
aircraft. [39:9]
Texas Instruments, Inc. is the systems integrator
and also produces the missile seeker, control section, wings
and fins. Other contractors produce the warhead, rocket
motor, and fuzing. [40:189]
The HARM weapon system began as a joint Navy-Air
Force program in June 1972. The Navy maintained lead direc-
tion of the program. Texas Instruments Inc. won the devel-
opment contract in 1974, the initial production contract in
1981, and full production contract in 1983. Originally, the
Navy wanted dual-source procurement, but the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) directed a sole-source
program with Texas Instruments. Although the Navy was
blunted in its desire for competitive procurement, the
threat of competition reduced negotiated program production
costs by approximately three percent. One of those cost
reducing techniques was a "no cost" warranty. [39:10]
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Equal quantities of missiles are budgeted for the
Navy and Air Force. The following actual/projected
procurement quantities and dollar values are presented:
[40:189]
YR QTY Dollar Value
1984 698 $379.2 million
1985 1,559 $589.5 million
1986 2,619 $752.0 million
1987 3,706 $930.8 million
2. SPARROW (AIM- 7)
The Sparrow (AIM-7F) is a "medium-range,
all-weather, all-aspect, semi-active guided missile."
[40:205]. It has been produced by Raytheon in different
versions since 1956. The initial FY-72 production contract
for the Sparrow (AIM-7F) was won by Raytheon with General
Dynamics established as a second source in FY-74. With the
FY-77 buy, dual-source competition was started. Out of a
total of four split-buy competitions, Raytheon won three.
[41:31]
The AIM/RIM-7M version of the Sparrow is similar to
the AIM-7F version, but with improved performance and the
capability to be used with a NATO Sea Sparrow launcher. The
AIM/RIM-7M is in full rate production by Raytheon after a
competitive flyoff with General Dynamics. Budgeted and
projected procurement plans entail over 14,000 AIM/RIM-7M
missiles for the Navy and Air Force with deliveries
beginning in 1982. [40:205]
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3. SIDEWINDER (AIM-9)
The AIM-9 family of air-to-air missiles was
originally developed in the 1950' s, with Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake, providing technical direction. It is "a
supersonic, air launched, rocket-propelled, infrared (IR)
guided missile designed to detect, track and destroy
aircraft." [42:16]
The current production version of the SIDEWINDER is
the AIM-9M. The Navy is the lead service on this joint
Navy/Air Force production program. It is made up of seven
primary units. The Guidance Control Section (GCS) and the
Reduced Smoke Rocket Motor (RSRM) were the components
modified with the newer version. The other five components,
in production since 1976, remained the same. [43:1]
Raytheon won the original GCS development contract
in FY-77 and a follow on production contract in FY-81. Ford
Aerospace was incorporated as a second source in FY-82.
Under the dual source mobilization base concept both Ford
Aerospace and Raytheon received competitive awards in FY-8 3
through FY-85. [43:5]
Thiokol Corp. won the original RSRM development
contract in FY-78 and a follow on production contract in
FY-81. Hercules-McGregor was incorporated as a second










The Navy is allocated a larger percentage of
missiles than the Air Force and Foreign Military Sales. The
following actual/projected procurement quantities and dollar
values are presented: [40:205, 43:6]







The Tomahawk is a $2.5 million subsonic cruise
missile. It comes in a ground-launch variant (GLCM) and a
ship launch variant (SLCM) . The Tomahawk can carry either
nuclear or conventional warheads. The Joint Cruise Missile
Project Office (JCMPO) was established in 1977 for managing
Tomahawk development with the Navy as the lead Service.
[44:152]
General Dynamics, Convair division, was the original
developer and producer of the Tomahawk. In 1982, JCMPO
awarded McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics contracts to
exchange Tomahawk technology with McDonnell Douglas as an
eventual co-producer of the missile. Throughout the early
Tomahawk development, the program experienced disappointing
test failures which led to delays in Fleet introduction.
Quality control problems were a major irritant. [40:85] Once
these problems were resolved, JCMPO projected to procure
1,861 missiles for fiscal years 1984-1988. The dollar
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values of these projected buys were over $4 billion dollars.
[40:86]
5. Commercial Communications Spacecraft
The Hughes Aircraft Company, Space and
Communications Group led the early pioneering efforts in
satellite communications in the early 1960 's. Hughes
developed and produced the spin stabilized satellite with
its successful commercial applications. Hughes-built
communications satellites have a reputation for durability;
they have a cumulative total of more than 320 years of
mission performance in outer space. Hughes maintains a
leading market share of sixty percent of all current commu-
nications satellites. There are forty five Hughes built




The preceding missiles are primarily joint Service
programs with the Navy as the lead service. Each missile
system receives support through both Navy and Air Force
logistics systems. The Sparrow and Sidewinder programs
involve relatively mature production technology with newer
models of missiles containing updated components. The
Sparrow, Sidewinder, and Tomahawk entail two prime
contractors in a competitive environment. Repetitive
procurements are projected for each program. Once a missile
is launched, it is difficult to pinpoint or identify
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particular causes of failures in flight. Significant
warranty issues within these programs include:
a. Use of Warranty Assessment Boards for the HARM and
SPARROW programs.
b. Leverage of a "no cost" warranty as a negotiation
technique for total cost reduction in the HARM program
with Texas Instruments.
c. Issue of "no cost" warranties generated by the
inclusion of a seven percent of acquisition cost for
warranty coverage in the Tomahawk program.
C. WARRANTY CONTRACTUAL ELEMENTS
There is a divergence of opinion as to what actually
constitutes an effective warranty contract clause. Some
outside influences which affect warranty contract clause
construction include equipment type, program requirements,
maturity of program, service regulations, the contractor,
the quality and depth of contract administration expertise
available, and the contracting officer himself. This list
of outside influences can be quite extensive. Both NAVAIR
and NAVSEA have developed quite similar warranty checklists
for ensuring "theoretical" and "essential" items are includ-
ed in each warranty clause. Figure 3 in Chapter III pre-
sents an example of the warranty checklist used by NAVSEA.
In an effort to obtain a better understanding of
warranty contract clause construction, at least three
contracting or technical personnel with extensive practical
experience in warranty application and coverage from each
Systems Command were interviewed. The following points
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summarize their responses to identifying the major elements
in warranty clause management:
- The piece of equipment itself
- Definable and measurable performance requirements
for compliance
- Statutory requirements
- Duration of warranty for verification of equipment
capabilities
- Maintenance philosophy and need for operational repairs
- Ability to enforce warranty
- Traceability of warranted equipment
- Looking at the economic power of the product— if it is
the main product of a company it is easy to enforce; if
it is a minor product of the company it is hard to
enforce
- Geographic location of failed unit
- Transportability of warranted equipment
- Impact on logistics and maintenance systems
- Statement of work from the prime contractor
The most frequent responses were the "equipment itself" and
"identified performance parameters." Taking the above
information and NAVAIR and NAVSEA warranty checklists into
consideration, the following sections identify key elements
in warranty contract clauses. A brief discussion of the
primary factors introduces each element.
A comparative analysis exhibits the manner in which five
different contract clauses treat that particular element.


















Definitions of key terms in the contract clauses are
highlighted. This is done to alleviate any possible
misunderstandings between the parties. Each party is







Acceptance, Missile Test Set, "Elapsed Time
Indicator (ETI) hours", Date of "Return to
Texas Instruments", Date of "Return to the
Government", HARM Warranty Board
Acceptance, Guidance-Control Section or GCS,
Date of "Return to the Contractor", "Date of
Return to the Government", Supplies, Price,
Government Mishandling, Lot, Repair, Sparrow
Warranty Assessment Board, Failure, Breach,
Design and Manufacturing Requirements
Acceptance, Supplies, Price, Government Mis-
handling and Misuse, Lot, Replacement,
Repair, Breach, Design and Manufacturing
Requirements, Failure, Relevant Failure
Defect or Deficiency, Correction, Supplies,
Design and Manufacturing Requirements,
Acceptance, Essential Performance Require-
ments, Warranted Failures
CCS: Definitions not highlighted
Three out of four of the Government contracts contained
these definitions: acceptance, design and manufacturing
requirements, supplies and failures. The definitions of
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acceptance, design and manufacturing requirements, and
supplies have essentially the same wording. The definition
of failure appears as key wording. In the Sparrow and
Sidewinder clauses, failures are identified to specific
components and test plans. Tomahawk failures are
attributable to not meeting the essential performance
requirements as defined by a certain Mean-Time-Between
Failure (MTBF) level. The definition includes a caveat in
stating that warranty failures are not limited to those MTBF
failures.
2 . Essential Performance Requirements
One of the major keys to constructing an effective
warranty contract clause is "verifiable" and "definable"
essential performance requirements. Within the context of
the new warranty law, essential performance requirements
are:
the operating capabilities, maintenance and reliability
characteristics of a weapon system, which is manufactured
in mature, full-scale production, necessary for it to
fulfill the military requirement for which the system is
designed. [3:46.7-3]
The manner in which essential performance requirements are
defined in DFARS allows the contracting officer to preclude
warranting "nonessential" performance requirements. [4:4]
This provides the contracting officer a great deal of
flexibility. For example, when warranting the performance
requirements of a new CG-51 class cruiser, the contracting
officer does not have to worry about warranting the chief's
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quarters head. The following is a breakdown of program
essential performance requirements:
HARM: - Captive Flight Reliability MTBF specification
compliance, (AS-5044) ; Initial captive flight
warranty assessment not made before a total
of 5,000 hours of ETI operation time has
accumulated.
- Storage failure rate; Degradation no greater
than 5% a year from a sample of 2 0% of
deliverable tactical missiles, each with
at least one year of storage.
- Reviewed quarterly by HARM Warranty
Assessment Board
SPARROW: Sampling of a production lot for four or
fewer relevant failures over 1,380 hours of
warranty verification testing (WVT) . Ten or
more relevant failures results in contractor
failing WVT.





Must meet or exceed 450 hours MTBF.
Product verification testing (PVT) performed
within twelve months after delivery of lot.
Government reserves right to test up to
twenty four months.
Lot must have five or fewer failures to pass
PVT with a combined lot testing of 1,755
hours. If greater than five failures, each
individual lot tested a full 1,755 hours.
Incoming inspection performed at Naval Weapon
Station Yorktown or Letterkenny Army Depot.
Individual ship suites allowed seventy five
warranty failures per year. Anything over
seventy five, the contractor pays.
Operating capabilities and reliability
characteristics identified in Prime Item and
Critical Item Development Specifications.
Communications channel meeting performance
parameters
.
Channel capable of being successfully
operated by Buyer.
Buyer has twenty four hours notification
responsibility if failure occurs.
Hughes is paid an additional performance
incentive amount if communications channels
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operated successfully longer than a
predetermined length of time.
Each of above clauses describes specific parameters to be
met. Sparrow and Sidewinder warranty testing appears to be
more of a receipt-inspection procedure. Harm and Tomahawk
involve operational usage. The inclusion of warranty
assessment boards in the Harm and Sparrow programs provides
additional management attention in determining warranty
effectiveness. In the Sparrow clause, it cannot be
determined what happens between four and ten failures. It
is interesting to note that in the commercial warranty the
contractor is paid an additional amount of money when he
exceeds performance parameters.
3 . Duration
Depending on the type of weapon system warranted,
the period of warranty coverage can be measured in calendar
days, operating hours, or any other suitable measure.
Beginning with Government acceptance, warranty duration
should be of sufficient length to verify the various
warranty elements or parameters. The amount of risk the
contractor is willing to assume should also be considered.
Two significant factors should be examined before deciding
on duration: 1) Installation or deployment schedule; 2)
Operating rate. [32:2-13] The following is a breakdown of
program duration lengths:





- Material and workmanship requirements: nine
months ("Storage" missiles are covered for
three years. Storage is defined)
.
- Specific performance requirements: three
years
- Warranty period adjustment: exclusive of
time spent in repair or replacement plus
thirty days for Government handling.
- Material and workmanship requirements: three
years.
- Specific performance requirements: three
years
- Warranty period adjustment: exclusive of
time spent in repair or replacement plus
thirty days for Government handling.
- Design and manufacturing requirements: three
years.
- Material and workmanship requirements: three
years.
- Warranty period adjustment: exclusive of
time spent in repair or replacement plus
thirty days for Government handling.
- Performance requirements warranted at time of
Government acceptance.
TOMAHAWK: - Design and manufacturing requirements: time
of Government acceptance.
- Material and workmanship requirements: time
of Government acceptance.
- Performance requirements verify depending on
contract line item and contractor.
CCS: - Performance period is negotiated. It
commences on the day the spacecraft is
positioned at the geosynchronous orbital
location, or sixty days after launch,
whichever is earlier.
A three year time period appears to be a relative standard
for warranty coverage, with an exclusion factor for repair
or replacement time. What is the significance of verifying
performance requirements at the time of Government accep-




as with the Harm? How much more does the Navy "indirectly"
pay for an additional three year time period?
4 . Marking
The DFARS maintains that warranted items must be
marked in accordance with MIL-STD-129, "Marking for
Shipments" and MIL-STD-130, "Identification Marking of U.S.
Military Property." [3:46.7-2] This leaves open the




Contract number of procurement
Expiration of warranty
Where to ship the item while under warranty
The marking medium can involve: 1) metal plate, 2) tag, 3)
self adhesive decal, and 4) log book records. Bar coding
and laser etching are future initiatives in the marking
area. The following is a breakdown of program marking
requirements
:
HARM: - Indication a warranty exists
- Expiration date
- Whom to notify if the item is found to be
defective
- Expiration date adjustment for repair or
replacement time
SPARROW: - Each "severable" component and contractor
shipping container to indicate warranty
exists
- Disassembly of warranted unit not authorized
in the event of failure
- Expiration date
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- Contact "NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND,
AIR-42011D" in the event of failure
SIDEWINDER: - Expiration date adjustment for repair or re-
placement time
- (Specific requirements provided in separate
attachments to contract which are not
available)
TOMAHAWK: - Not addressed in warranty clause
CCS: - Not addressed in warranty clause
Three of the clauses reviewed have similar marking
requirements, but not identical. The HARM and Sparrow
requirements require notification in the event of failure.
What should be done with the failed unit while awaiting
disposition instructions? None of the clauses required the
contract number and lot number be marked on the warranty
label. This may cause trouble in trying to track the unit.
The NAVAIR marking requirements were published after the
above contract clauses were negotiated.
5. Repair and Corrective Action Responsibilities and
Remedies
The DFARS provides the contracting officer three
possible remedies to invoke if the warranted item fails
during the agreed upon warranty coverage period. These
remedies include but are not limited to: 1) Contractor
correction of failure, 2) Government correction of failure,
and 3) Equitable contract price reduction. [346.7-4] With
contractor correction of a failed unit, no additional costs
may be charged to the Government in terms of an increase in:
1) price of a fixed-price contract, 2) target or ceiling
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price of an incentive contract, and 3) estimated costs or
fees of a cost reimbursement contract. This essentially
translates into the contractor bearing the transportation
costs to and from a repair facility. [4:6]
Using the option of Government repair can remove
restrictions in meeting Fleet readiness objectives by having
shipboard repair. Should a predetermined Government cost
calculation be included in the contract for consistency in
reimbursement? What avenues are left to the contractor for
failure verification if this option is exercised?
The third option, "an equitable contract price
reduction" sounds fine in theory, but may prove difficult to
apply for some of the same reasons mentioned above. This
appears to leave the door open to litigation because of the
vagueness of its regulatory basis. [4:6] The following is
a breakdown of program repair and corrective action
responsibilities and remedies:
HARM: - Design and manufacturing requirements:
contractor repair or replace failures.
- Material and workmanship: contractor repair
or replace failure if the failure adversely
affects the performance, durability,
reliability, interchangeability, effective
use or operation, weight or safety of the
warranted item. The Government is entitled
to an equitable adjustment in contract price
if the defect does not affect the previously
mentioned elements.
- Performance requirements: Contractor repair
or replace failure; if not, contractor pays
costs incurred by Government in procuring
replacement item.
SPARROW: - The contractor inducts failed units for






delivery order. The Government is reimbursed
a percentage of repair cost. The percentage
is calculated by a formula specified in the
contract. Failures are determined through
warranty verification test (WVT) procedures.
- Contractor repair or replace failures.
- If the contractor has the inability to repair
or replace or if the Government does not
require repair or replacement, the Government
is entitled to an equitable adjustment in
price.
- Design and manufacturing, material and
workmanship requirements: Contractor repair
or replace failed items or furnish to the
Government the necessary materials, parts,
and installation instructions to affect
corrective action.
- Performance requirements: Contractor pays
all costs of repair or Government entitled to
an equitable adjustment.
- Buyer entitled to a prenegotiated "Spacecraft
Performance Warranty Payment" for failure.
To make the contractor truly responsible, the scope of his
corrective actions must be precisely defined to avoid
problems. The above clauses provide definitive guidance on
who does what within each remedy. In determining an
equitable adjustment, the contract clauses could be more
exact. Only the Sparrow clause provides specific
calculations for determining payment,
elements were included upfront
reimbursement charges or equitable
negotiation with the contractor may be simpler. In reality
the contracting officer who negotiated the original warranty
clause will probably not be the one who decides on remedy
action. The above contract clauses seem to be limited
If specific cost
when determining
adj ustments , then
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only to the three remedies provided in DFARS. Those
warranty clauses may prove more effective and concise if
some of the following areas were also taken into
consideration: [46:16]
- Installation of replacement parts (including item tear-
down and reassembly)
.
- Repair or replacement of secondary damage resulting from




- Providing and/or installing retrofit parts.
- Revision of manuals and other technical data.
- Modification of support equipment.
- Provisioning of consignment spare parts.
Recognizing that each situation is unique, warranty remedies
should be tailored and not limited to any particular set of
remedies.
6. Turnaround Time
When the warranted item is in critical short supply
or of high dollar value, turnaround time is a critical
element of the contract clause. Specific and enforceable
time limits must be considered. The inclusion of liquidated
damages for not meeting specified times may preclude future
litigation. [46:16] Another factor to consider is how long
it takes organic Navy repair activities to fix that
particular item. Are consignment spares being utilized to
cover the system shortfall of the failed item? The
following is a breakdown of program turnaround times:
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HARM: - ninety day turnaround time, provided that the
rate of return does not exceed ten per month.
- Turnaround time with return rate greater
than ten per month to be negotiated.
SPARROW: - One hundred twenty day turnaround time,
provided that the rate of return does not
exceed ten per month and "parts are
available.
"
- Circumstances other than above to be
negotiated.
SIDEWINDER: - Contractor shall use his best effort to
repair/replace failed units within one
hundred eighty days and in no event shall
time to repair take longer than twelve
months, provided return rate does not exceed
twenty five per month.
TOMAHAWK: - Not addressed
CCS: - Not addressed
A wartime scenario may completely revise turnaround times.
Instead of saying "with a return rate greater than ten,
turnaround time to be negotiated" , it might be more
effective to include a graduated turnaround time schedule or
provide the contractor with an incentive pool to meet
turnaround times. Conversely, provide some type of penalty
or liquidated damages if turnaround times are not met. The
Sidewinder Program provides a six month "grace" period for
not meeting turnaround time requirements.
7 . Transportation
The Navy operates worldwide. Transportation costs
can be significant if shipping a large item from the middle
of the Indian Ocean. If these transportation costs were for
warranty failures, it would seem obvious that the contractor
would pay for the transportation costs. This is
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particularly true if the warranty remedy used "requires
contractor to promptly take corrective action, as necessary,
at no additional cost to the Government." [3:46.7-4] The
following is a breakdown of program transportation elements:
HARM: - Government bears the cost of transportation
to the weapons station (in CONUS).
Contractor bears the transportation costs for
all sections between the weapon station and
the contractor's plant and subsequent return
to the weapon station (in CONUS)
.
SPARROW: - Same as above with the exception that the
transportation cost is based on a percentage.
This percentage is the same as used in
calculating repair reimbursements.
SIDEWINDER: - Same as HARM
TOMAHAWK: - Contractor bears the transportation cost from
the place of delivery specified in contract
to the contractor's plant and return.
CCS: - Not applicable
All four Government transportation clauses are essentially
the same. It is not clear to this researcher that if the
Government invokes the contractor correction remedy, why the
Government should share the transportation costs with the
contractor. The transportation cost from any overseas point
to CONUS is, in effect, an increase in the price of the
contract.
8. Additional Special Clauses
The following discussion highlights special clauses
in each warranty contract clause not mentioned previously.
HARM: - Responsibilities of HARM Warranty Assessment
Board
- Use of specifically identified test equipment
for verifying failure.
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- Contractor maintaining a separate cost
account for cost of administering warranty-
clause
- Responsibility of SPARROW Warranty Assessment
Board.
- Inclusion of a nonrelevant failure category.
(For example, failure determined to be the
result of operator error)
.
- Detailed logistics handling plan for handling
warranted items
.
- Submittal of failure analysis report by
contractor on each failed unit.
- Detailed marking requirements.
-If contractor found not to be in breach of
warranty after complying with Government
direction, the contractor is compensated
under the "Changes-Fixed Price" clause.
- Specific contractor notification requirements
of failed unit.
- Simply stated performance requirements.
- Equitable adjustment for partial performance.
- Refund of performance payments for failures.
Because each situation is unique, anyone of the
above special elements could be incorporated into other
warranty clauses for more effective warranty administration.
9 . Clause Summary
Each of the warranty contract clauses reviewed
demonstrated innovative warranty management techniques.
More consistency between clauses in marking requirements and
failure reporting procedures would seem to promote effective
warranty management at the user level. This is particularly
important since each program is a joint Service program with
the Air Force. Only the Tomahawk clause mentions Air Force
procedures.
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Although these clauses were negotiated prior to
publication of the Navy warranty policy instruction, these
clauses meet the majority of the draft instruction
SECNAVINST 43 3 0. XX requirements. The following area of the
instruction is not in the clauses: "Segregation of all
actual cost data associated with warranty requirements of
the contracts is not contractually required."
The contractual requirement of a quarterly review by
a warranty assessment board provides an excellent management
tool for gauging warranty effectiveness of a particular
program. As mentioned previously, establishing a warranty
assessment board for each program may prove difficult or
time consuming.
Tailored clauses fit the contract to the situation.
Each situation is unique as can be discerned from the
preceding clause comparison. This is effective only if the
Fleet user can operate within one warranty administration
plan. For example, an ordnance type on a carrier may be
faced with separate warranty programs while maintaining
Harm, Sidewinder, and Sparrow missiles. Warranty contrac-
tual requirements must be structured so that the user is
provided with enough information to effectively utilize the
warranty.
D. EFFECT ON NEGOTIATIONS
As with any new way of doing business, the new warranty
law has varying degrees of impact on negotiation.
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Contracting officers have been forced to get up to speed
quickly on warranty statutory requirements and the
intricacies of applying cost/benefit analysis to warranty
coverage.
Contracting officers were interviewed from each of the
three Hardware Systems Commands in an effort to pinpoint the
impact of warranties on negotiations. The following are the
major points from those interviews:
1. During the first year of implementation, negotiations
of warranty terms, conditions and costs were often
protracted and contentious.
2. In a sole source situation, negotiating a "no cost"
warranty is difficult.
3. In a competitive situation, warranty requirements can




Negotiating warranties often prolongs total
negotiation duration. (No particular time element was
defined.) This increase in time leads to an increase
in costs, both in dollars and manhours.
5. There is increased involvement of technical personnel
in negotiations to decipher design and manufacturing
requirements and essential performance requirements.
The above points underscore the high learning curve
involved with warranty negotiations by both the contractor
and the Government. This rate of learning was restricted by
the fact that the warranty law requirements changed in
successive years. With an upfront investment in time and
training in warranty applications and cost/benefit analysis
for contracting personnel, the negotiations learning curve
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can be improved. Excellent dividends will result once the
warranty is operational.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter attempted to highlight the principal
contractual elements of a warranty clause. Five different
contract clauses were compared and analyzed. For the most
part, the four Navy clauses reviewed are in compliance with
draft SECNAVINST 43 30. XX. The commercial warranty reviewed
was much simpler in format. Instead of penalizing the
seller, the commercial warranty used incentives for
performance exceeding established parameters.
Chapter V investigates potential and actual problems
encountered in warranty administration. Problems perceived
by this researcher with Navy instructions in Chapter III and
the contract clauses of this chapter will be brought out in
appropriate problem elements of Chapter V.
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V. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN WARRANTY MANAGEMENT
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
As with any significant change in a complex process,
such as acquisition of major weapon systems in the Navy,
problems may arise in execution of the change. Applying
warranties to major weapon systems is a drastic change in
doing business. This chapter brings out the various
problems in administering the new warranty law from actual
implementation of the new law to applying contract clauses.
This chapter serves to analyze the issues and problems the
Navy is having or may encounter with the application of
warranties to major weapon systems. The researcher poses
several questions within each issue and follows with an
analysis and possible answers.
B. COST/PRICING
While the issue of cost pervades most of the following
problems with warranties, extra costs may be incurred
anytime during the duration of the warranty. Do the
benefits of warranties outweigh the extra costs? With
Figure 1 in Chapter II in mind, the Government should be
willing to buy a warranty if the cost of the warranty is
less than the benefits. The contractor should be willing to
sell or provide a warranty if the costs are at least
covered. As indicated in Figure 1 the warranty coverage
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agreed upon will depend on the cost estimates of both
parties which will in turn depend upon the reliability of
the warranted system. [47:9] General Skantze, Vice Chief
of Staff, U.S. Air Force gives this analogy with warranty
cost estimates:
What do you think the reaction would be if the Army or the
Air Force said to a contractor, "We want you to build us a
1-megawatt space laser and then guarantee its perform-
ance"? Even if he could figure out how to price that
warranty we wouldn't be able to pay for it. [48:6]
With weapon systems costs rapidly rising combined with a
general tightening of the defense budget, finding money to
fund most initial upfront warranty cost (either a separate
line item cost or additional profit) becomes extremely
difficult. Will warranty cost estimates be encouraged to
look optimistic?
The DOD Cost to Produce Handbook , although relatively
dated, maintains that the cost estimate of warranties might
range from two to ten percent per year of the acquisition
contract. [49:24] With state-of-the-art technology and
complex design for weapon systems, such as the F/A-18, in
all probability the warranty cost would tend toward the
upper range. [50:7] In a fair and equitable contract it
only seems reasonable that the contractor be compensated for
the additional risk he is assuming. The issue is how much
of the risk should be borne by the contractor and how should
he be reimbursed for it.
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In a cost situation this decision on risk in the
warranty issue involves a trade-off of the cost of the
warranty versus the probable cost to the Government for
correction without a warranty. [51:67] In order to
effectively make a decision concerning warranty trade-off,
an accurate and tailored cost analysis must be conducted
both with and without a warranty. To do this requires a
significant amount of work. As discussed previously, Navy
Systems Command personnel have received little training and
were unfamiliar with warranty cost effectiveness analysis.
To make warranty trade-offs, the various cost elements
must be separated from the actual cost of the weapon system.
There is no assurance that the supplier is not padding the
purchase price of the weapon system with costs of the
warranty, if the price of the warranty was not included in
his bid or proposal. [13:29]
In order to better understand the potentially expensive
implication of warranties, discussion will concentrate on
some of the direct and indirect cost factors associated with
warranty cost development. These costs are essentially
those equated with life cycle cost models.
1. Direct Warranty Cost Factors
In determining if a warranty is cost effective, "The
analysis should examine a weapon system's life cycle costs,
both with and without a warranty . . . ." [3:46.7-5]
Therefore all acquisition, operation, and support elements
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that are a part of life cycle costs and that are affected by
warranty coverage should be reviewed. Table 4 represents
those direct warranty cost factors that are determined to be
important for warranty evaluation.
TABLE 4
LIST OF WARRANTY COST EVALUATION ELEMENTS
Reliability
Mean time between failure















































In the case of Mean Time Between Failure,
(MTBF) , as a measure of reliability, an increase in MTBF
will increase production and procurement costs but should
decrease repair costs for the manufacturer and the system
buyer. A decrease in MTBF may reduce procurement costs but
should increase repair costs. [47:10] This cost is an
expectation of what the failure rate may be. With an
untried weapon system this could prove to be risky. The
contractor will obviously require adequate compensation.
b. Maintainability
Although the false-pull rate and false return
rate are easily costed, the key question is who should make
the determination of which is false. Should another
auditor/evaluator be involved or should the Administrative
Contracting Officer be responsible? In the contract clauses
reviewed in Chapter IV, the Disputes Clause gave the
contracting officer the final determination.
A possible solution would be to have a
contractor/Government team review possible discrepancies.
Warranty Assessment Boards, such as those used in the HARM
or Sparrow programs described in Chapter IV, appeared to be
excellent examples of such a Board.
c. Readiness
Determining system availability is difficult to
measure directly. Failure rates of new equipment tend to
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vary bcause of many different factors—untried technology,
operator inexperience, optimistic performance predictions,
and new maintenance practices. These many different
variables translate system availability into an estimate
built on many different estimates of future characteristics.
The margin for error is likely to be compounded,
d. Logistics Flow
The logistics flow of both failed and repaired
units is normally through lengthy traditional supply lines.
This requires additional spares. [52:35] Who should manage
and pay for those spares? Since it could be a function of
the warranty, should the contractor be responsible? How
would this interact with various Navy inventory management
systems? The contractor's ability to affect dependable
repair turnaround times is the key. In the case of the
Sidewinder contract clause, the contractor is given a six
month leeway in turnaround time.
The researcher has found that maintaining a
separate warranty spares inventory alongside the standard
Navy inventory management systems may prove cumbersome.
Adjusting inventory management models to accommodate
warranties is not the answer because of the variability
between warranty elements as highlighted in Chapter IV. An
alternative to these spares problems may be to adopt a




In evaluating the actual unit hardware costs
,
the contracting officer might assume that the costs of
warranty provisions are not reflected as direct elements of
the purchase. How can it be determined that the unit cost
is not padded with some warranty cost? [13:29] In the case
of the Navy, which will not pay for warranties per se, this
is a particularly evident problem. Should the Navy make the
contractor cost out warranties separately, similar to new
procurement regulations which segregate unallowable costs?




Support costs vary with the type of equipment
under the warranty and the maintenance required. The amount
of warranty administration involved could prove to be the
largest undeterminable cost. In a May 1985 Warranty
Conference sponsored by the Office of Naval Acquisition
Support, (ONAS) , the general consensus was that warranty
administration is the weakest link in the effective
utilization of warranties. (31:VI) The following factors
at the field level of warranty administration must be taken
into consideration.
- Training of field level personnel on warranty use and
recognition.
- Local preventive maintenance.
- Invalidation of warranty seals.
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g. Contract Price Adjustment
There are various actions which can affect
warranty contract price adjustments. The most prominent
adjustment is for unverified-failures. A certain percentage
of the Fleet returned failed units will actually be good.
In processing these erroneously returned units, the
contractor could reguest the Government to mitigate his
incurred costs. If these costs are reimbursed without
guestion, the contractor might be less motivated to reduce
these actions through "its design, built-in test eguipment,
maintenance manuals, and training procedures." [32:2-14]
To egualize these risks, a compromise is
recommended by reimbursing the contractor for unverified
failures that exceed a preestablished percentage of all
returned units. For example, avionics warranties generally
exhibit rates between twenty and thirty percent. Anything
above that rate, the contractor is reimbursed for unverified
failures. The contracting officer must balance these costs
and risks. [32:2-14]
h. Transition Costs
The various costs involved with shifting
"ownership" of a weapon system from the contractor to the
Government may be avoided by planning early in the weapon
system development cycle. One cost that would be hard to
guantify early would be the cost of modification to
eguipment as the result of failure history.
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This cost of modification to equipment will vary
with the addition of warranties. The contractor will tend
to apply most attention to the front end of the warranty
where there is some assurance of payback before the warranty
expires. [13:29] Toward the end of the warranty, equipment
performance suffers. When the warranty expires, the Navy is
left with a technological out-of-date piece of equipment.
While the direct costs in Table 4 could be
unwieldy to model and estimate, it is not an impossible
task. They could allow for comparisons to be made from
similar pieces of equipment or historical data. The
researcher has found that the Navy does not currently have a
comprehensive warranty database to do this.
2 . Indirect Warranty Cost Factors
Factors affecting indirect warranty costs must also
be taken into consideration when evaluating total warranty
costs. One source indicated that there are six major factors
involved with indirect warranty costs. The factors are
contained in Table 5.
The philosophy and strategies that deal with the
above factors are more heavily a function of the program
office. The cost estimating and negotiating of the indirect
warranty costs remains within the role of the contracting
officer.
The full impact of any of those indirect warranty
cost factors in Table 5 is generally not felt for several
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TABLE 5
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF FACTORS AFFECTING
INDIRECT WARRANTY COSTS
Category Definition
Competition Cost of opportunities in competitive
marketplace for acquisition of
equipment and parts
Break-Out Cost of opportunities for break-out
acquisition of subassemblies
Warranty Bail Out Cost to the Government in the event
the contractor fails to fulfill its
warranty obligations
Technology Cost of opportunities in technolog-
ical advances
Second-Sourcing Cost of opportunities in second-
sourcing production units
Readiness Cost of loss of readiness and failed
maintenance capabilities in combat
environment
Source: [12:390]
years. An example of this is the cost of competition with
warranties. The tremendous impact of competition translates
into increased breakout of spare parts and second sourcing.
Difficulties arise with managing different warranty
administration plans for the same weapon systems, and with
the contractor requiring pedigreed parts to maintain the
warranty coverage.
In any evaluation of the costs and benefits of
warranties, indirect warranty costs factors must be taken
into consideration. Indirect warranty costs and the factors
driving those costs, nonetheless are extremely difficult to
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estimate. SECNAVINST 4330. XX identifies various indirect
warranty costs, but does not provide a means for estimating
them. This researcher did not find any comprehensive
warranty cost estimating techniques which calculated or took
into consideration indirect warranty costs.
3
.
Baseline Approach to Warranties
Appendix D provides a brief description of the three
major warranty provisions and methods used to analyze their
costs. [53:392] Each method shown is based on estimates of
some kind. When analyzing these estimates the following
questions must be asked: [54]
a. Was the right technique used for evaluation?
b. What assumptions were used as the basis?
c. How was it applied?
4 Warranty Costing Methodologies
The preceding sections identified various warranty
cost factors and categories. Three possible procedures for
warranty cost estimation using previously identified cost
factors are now reviewed. There currently are no standard
DOD warranty cost estimating models. SECNAVINST 4330. XX
provides a Warranty Cost-Benefit Analysis Policy Outline .
This Outline provides only general guidance and not
specifics on costing warranties.
a. Warranty Cost Estimating Relationships (WCER)
While warranty cost could be estimated through a
WCER based on size and weight of the system purchase, other
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more critical data variables must be taken into account. A
simple WCER could be computed as a percentage of unit
acquisition cost. For example: [32:4-6]
warranty cost per year
unit acquisition cost = 4%
+ 0.2% x (months of discovery
period)
- 0.1% x (years equipment has been
fielded)
More detailed WCER's could be developed based on various
levels of detail or based on warranty provisions as
described in Appendix D.
The ultimate test of any WCER is that it is
logical and can predict with some degree of certainty.
[55:3-73] While a WCER would be easy to use once developed,
the uniqueness between weapon systems and the variability
among warranty provisions makes WCER's difficult to apply
across the board. In addition, it would require constant
refinements. As in the contract clauses reviewed in Chapter
IV, each clause was for a similar piece of equipment, but
the warranty elements of each clause were considerably
different.
b. Bottom-Up Accounting Model
The Air Force Reliability Improvement Warranty,
(RIW) , Life Cycle Cost Model may be the best current
approach as an accounting model. It takes various cost
drivers described in previous sections and combines them in
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a logical, engineering approach that is designed to include
all incurred costs and calculate their sum. [56 .'Appendix A]
Example of repair cost estimations. [32:4-10]
Repair $ = (cost per repair) x (number of repairs)
= cost x hours x operating hours
hour repair expected hours per failure
+ (material $) + (shipping $)
The above example is only a small part of the
complete model. Because of the amount of accurate and
reliable data involved with the RIW model, this model could
prove cumbersome to use and expensive to maintain. Although
computer technology could reduce some of the complicated
aspects, the model needs to be developed and refined for
each weapon system use.
c. Rule-of-Thumb Ratio
A Rule-of-Thumb Ratio for warranty costs can be
as simple as: [32:4-3] warranty price *
acquisition price = percentage
base
*based on historical data from similar programs
Although this ratio provides a quick, rough
order of magnitude, it can only be used as a "ballpark"
estimate. Because of the high dollar value and variability
between different weapon systems, this method should be used
as gauge. For final negotiation and proposal analysis, a
much more detailed approach should be taken.
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5. Warranty Cost Summary
The biggest concern in warranty cost estimation is
how to do it. Warranty requirements for major weapon
systems have been in place for almost two years. Yet, few
management personnel know how to perform a cost estimate
analysis or even how to approach it. This causes undue and
risky reliance on the contractor to price and cost the
warranty as well as the analysis of the contractor's
methodology instead of preparing an independent estimate for
comparison purposes. [57:63]
This reliance on the contractor for estimating
warranty costs is more of a case of "the blind leading the
blind." One contractor interviewed stated, "Warranty
costing is too hard. All we do is pick a percentage of the
unit cost." Where does that leave the contracting officer?
The tools a contracting officer currently has for an
independent cost analysis, specifically those in warranties,
often fall short of what is needed for sound business
decisions. Educating contracting officers on the various
cost models available is the first step for improving this.
The Navy should investigate the use of computerized cost
models, such as the Army "WARM" Model and the Air Force PPAC
Life-Cycle-Cost/Breakdown Structure Model. Both of these
systems can be used with telephone computer modems.
A 1979 Defense Audit Service (DAS) report
highlighted several problems caused by lack of knowledge by
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DOD procurement personnel who did not have a specific
knowledge of the extent and reasonableness of costs for
warranty coverage. Some of the findings of the audit showed
that contractors: [58]
- improperly allocated commercial warranty expense to DOD
contracts
- prorated warranty expense to all DOD contracts, not just
those with warranties
- were reimbursed for warranty expense under negotiated
contracts as an element of product cost and again as an
element of profit
The above findings are relevant to today's warranty
contracts. These problems on the procurement side of
warranties compound the lack of warranty knowledge problems
at the field level.
C. CONTRACT CLAUSE MANAGEMENT
1. Negotiations/Administration
Warranty administration, in the words of Mr. Ken
Jackson, in an article for Contract Management is: "Good
Luck." Warranty administration will require a tremendous
amount of time and effort by Government and industry
personnel. According to Mr. Jackson, a sound base—writing,
developing, and negotiating the warranty clause, must be
created to ensure the warranty is effective. [59:15]
With the significant numbers of variables involved
in warranties, buyers and contract administrators must
expend more effort in carrying out the contract. This adds
to the ever increasing number of regulations with which
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contracting personnel must contend. This will only slow
down the already lengthy procurement lead time. Table 2 in
Chapter II points out several examples of the effect warran-
ties have had on the length of negotiations. What happens
in a sole source environment with warranty negotiations? If
the Navy requires the weapon system, how is a negotiator
going to get a sole source contractor to agree to a "no
cost" warranty? As discussed in the Program Background
section of Chapter IV, the threat of competition may
alleviate this. The ability of the sole source contractor
to maintain his market position is one of the essential
factors involved.
2 . Litigation
Before enactment of the new warranty laws, Federal
Agency Boards of Contract Appeals decided only twenty five
breach of warranty claims within a five year period. The
contractor was awarded relief in more than half of those
cases. [4:8] In an interview with the Clerk of the Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals in June 1986, it was
found that there were no cases pending or decided concerning
the new warranty laws. A review of the Federal Legal
Information Through Electronics (FLITE) database confirmed
this.
It is this researcher's view that from a contractual
standpoint current warranty administration, within the
context of the new warranty law, leaves itself wide open to
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litigation. The following are only a few examples which
could lend themselves to contractual litigation.
a. The burden of proof is placed on the Government in
proving claims against the contractor. A situation
such as a missile failure in flight may prove
difficult to resolve. [60:52-55]
b. The Government is responsible for providing timely
notice that the warranty has been breached. The
definition of timely notice would have to be
constructed to reconcile the possibilities of ship
deployments and a war time scenario. [60:52-55]
c. If the contractor warrants a weapon system that the
Government provided by the design and specifications,
the Government may run into problems recovering on
that warranty. [60:52-55]
d. If a warranted item sustains combat damage to part of
the equipment, what are the effects of the warranty
on the complete system? [60:52-55]
e. If the Navy repaired a warranted item, the contractor
is responsible for reimbursing the Government the
"reasonable" cost of repair. The contractor may be
able to prove that the Navy did not take all the
reasonable steps to exercise the warranty before doing
repairs. The issue of a "reasonable" cost definition
surfaces. The contractor may want to apply commercial
rates. [17:35] Of the five contract clauses
reviewed, only the Sparrow clause provided specific
cost calculations. An example from this weapon
system is:
I
percentage of added repair cost =
100 [ 1 - 1380 + 411.25 1
N N 550
N = the number of failures (5 or more) experienced
in Warranty Verification Testing
f. If the "likely" cause of a warranty failure has been
determined to be the result of the contractor's
design, material or workmanship, the contractor
assumes the burden of proof that his work did not
cause a failure. What evidence is afforded to the
contractor when the weapon system is lost to hostile
fire or is completely destroyed? This possible
problem would first have to be resolved by the
Government, as mentioned above. The Government must
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produce evidence that the failure was the result of
contractor performance. [1:616-626]
If the Government could have prevented a breach of
warranty, the Government cannot recover any damages
under the warranty. Can a contractor prove that the
warranted item did not receive the proper preventive
maintenance? Will the contractor now dictate fully
what type of maintenance and repair parts will be used
on "his" system? [1:617-626] This could be to the
Government's advantage. The contractor now may be
more motivated to become involved earlier in the
planning of a weapon system maintenance plan. A
better coordinated and comprehensive maintenance plan
may result.
D. TECHNOLOGY
Weapon systems are frequently on the "leading edge" of
technology. Forcing the contractor to warrant an untried
system may lead to undesirable results. Admiral James D.
Watkins, then the Chief of Naval Operations, in testimony on
warranty provisions before the Senate Armed Services
Committee stated:
Many military products necessarily involve state-of-the-
art technology, are required to operate in extremely
hostile and unforeseen environments and must tolerate
abuse well beyond that found in the home. [61:44]
This state-of-the-art technology must be responsive to a
military threat. The various threats to national defense
are continually changing. This in effect changes the
mission performance of the weapon system. Increasing
performance often involves technological superiority. Will
warranties hinder contractor pursuit of advanced
technological solutions to different threats? [21:28]
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With changes in state-of-the-art technology, contractors
are subjected to additional technical risks. The potential
for increased warranty exposure is raised. With this in
mind, will a contractor be motivated to stay with tried and
proven techniques to reduce his risk rather than new and
innovative approaches? [61:44] These technology issues are
tough to quantify. The long range aspects of and answers to
this issue place it beyond the scope of this research. A
suggestion would be to have an organization like the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency monitor this effect of
warranties on technology development.
A side effect of new technology with warranty coverage
is that failure rates of new equipment are more difficult to
estimate. [61:44] A warranty might not be cost effective
if the new equipment has a very low failure rate.
E. COMPONENT BREAKOUT
Under the theme of competition and cost savings,
procurement of spares from contractors other than the prime
weapon system contractor is heavily stressed. Warranty
coverage may reduce any possible gains from this program.
The Navy, in order to maintain its warranty of a particular
weapon system, has little choice but to buy pedigreed parts
from the prime contractor. [13:24] What happens in the
case of two or more contractors producing the same systems,
(as was the case in three out of four contract clauses
reviewed in Chapter IV) ? Can parts be interchanged between
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contractors? Requiring this contractually may be part of
the solution.
This is an extremely significant issue in terms of the
costs and time involved in administering different
warranties for the same system. This researcher recommends
that a possible way to avoid this in the front end, is for
the program manager and contracting officer to take the
additional costs into consideration when the program
acquisition strategy is generated. A waiver can be
requested if the warranty is not cost effective.
If the Navy insists on component breakout in conjunction
with warranty coverage, the prime contractor could end up
charging the Navy more money to compensate for his risk of
warranting a system over which he has little control.
[50:8]
It appears that warranties and component breakout may
run in different directions. One may say the Navy could get
warranties on any parts that were broken out from the
original contractor, but with the large number of different
components involved in a weapon system and the associated
warranties, administration of these warranties would soon
become an administrative nightmare.
F. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (GFE)
The Government furnished equipment problem is similar to
the component breakout problem discussed above. For
example, a particular GFE component, which is separately
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guaranteed by the GFE contractor is critical to the overall
performance of the complete weapon system. Now the prime
contractor must warrant the complete weapon system, which
includes the GFE. Even though the prime is only responsible
for the correct installation of the GFE, the complexity of
risk assumption increases considerably. Who should be
responsible? Should the Government pay the contractor to
manage the GFE warranties? What happens when the GFE causes
the contractor's warranted equipment to fail? [62:4.7]
These risk factors should cause the Government to reexamine
the inclusion of GFE in the weapon system. If these
additional risks translate into significant costs, the
Government might be better off having the prime contractor
provide the total system without GFE, if possible. A good
illustration of part of this problem occurred with the
production of UH-1H aircraft for the Army. The aircraft
itself was covered under warranty by the prime contractor.
GFE used in production of the aircraft was also covered
under warranty by the GFE manufacturer. When the GFE was
received and installed, the warranty paperwork was
inadvertently discarded by the contractor. Even though, in
this case, the problem was the prime contractor's making,
causing the prime contractor to accept additional risk or
increasing his own warranty administration will invariably
cost the Navy more money. [63]
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G. SUBCONTRACTOR/SMALL BUSINESS
Along with the component breakout issue, warranties may
generate fewer occasions for small contractors to get
involved with spare parts contracts. Although subcontrac-
tors and small businesses are not one in the same, several
of their problems with warranties are related.
Requiring subcontractors to provide performance
guarantees may force small and medium-sized firms out of the
defense industry. The small business should have enough
reserve capital to accommodate any penalties incurred from
performance guarantees. [64:25] What happens if the firm
goes bankrupt because of warranty coverage? Where does the
Government step in?
A majority of the Navy Systems Commands personnel
interviewed felt that this was not a salient issue. The
tone of their responses was if the contractors buckle down
and do the job that they are capable of, the cost impact
should be negligible.
Prime contractors may be in a difficult situation with
subcontractors, where in the subcontractor is a sole source
to the prime contractor. The subcontractor could refuse any
flow down warranty clause requested by the prime contractor.
If the prime contractor cannot "make" the required part and
is forced to "buy" the part from the subcontractor, the
prime will have to absorb any warranty coverage or pass it
on to the Government. [65:6]
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H. COMPETITION
Each one of the preceding issues could hinder competi-
tion in some form or the other. In a leader-follower
scenario for example, contractors may refuse to undertake
any contract in which they must provide a performance
warranty on a weapon system not of their own design. Prime
contractors may run into the same problems with subcontrac-
tors who are not willing to guarantee another's design.
This may cause prime contractors to perform more work in
house rather than subcontract out. The issue of financial
reserves to pay possible penalties also may limit the number
of entries in the defense market. [62:5.5] With the Navy's
heavy emphasis on competition, which is illustrated by the
three out of four dual source contract clauses reviewed
previously, the Navy has to track two different contractors
for the same system in order to exercise the warranty. Are
these situations taken into consideration singularly or
jointly when determining warranty cost effectiveness? In
this researcher's view, this should be a program manager's
responsibility. In developing his acquisition strategy, the
program manager has the overall picture on program costs.
Close coordination between the program manager and the
contracting officers for each source is a necessity.
I. LOGISTICS/PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
With extended-life programs keeping weapon systems in
operation longer, warranty coverage might not extend over
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the entire life cycle of the weapon system. [66:37] If
this is the case, there are a number of factors that must be
taken into consideration to maintain support of the
equipment.
1. Funding must be retained in the program for transfer
of ownership cost.
2. Technicians and maintenance facilities must be
available for repair.
3. Technical manuals and spare parts must be in
sufficient quantities to support maintenance.
4. Did the original contract contain an option for
extended warranty protection? [67:10]
The key to warranty transfer is planning. The Navy,
because they did not service the equipment, might not have
the experience to do the planning. To avoid this problem,
would the Navy be locked into the same contractor in
extending the warranty? The Army approaches this problem by
directing that maintenance levels and functions necessary
for normal support operations be the same during the
warranty time period and also with the time period following
warranty expiration. [27:7] This in effect forces the
planning upfront in consideration of a total life cycle
maintenance plan.
J. READINESS
Two aspects of readiness must be viewed with the effect
of warranties: operational availability and sustainability.
Failed systems under warranty must either wait for the
contractor to fix it on site or be shipped back to the
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contractor's plant. This adds up to extended downtime for
the equipment. In a wartime scenario, the contractor will
be hard pressed to keep up with demands for repair service.
Would the Navy supplement the contractor with military
personnel? If the contractor has other defense related
work, this only compounds the problem. [50:8] What effect
does this have on surge and mobilization capabilities?
During the research, no piece of literature or
interviewee addressed these issues. This researcher
observes that this possible conflict between readiness and
warranties will only be brought to the forefront when, in an
emergency situation warranties lead to a mission failure.
It would be hard to imagine an aircraft squadron
commander explaining to his Type Commander he cannot carry
out his mission because his planes are awaiting contractor
repair. That squadron commander would do everything in his
power to make his aircraft ready. Warranty or not, he would
find a way to fix his aircraft. Problems of invalidating a
warranty would be far from that commander's mind.
K. OTHER PROBLEMS
The following section briefly presents a variety of
problems that can be incurred in warranty coverage.
1. Item Marking
When the equipment reaches the field, there is
little guidance to field personnel in identifying warranty
equipment. While MIL-STD-129F attempts to standardize label
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format, there are still problems with the lack of sufficient
information about warranty terms placed on the equipment
itself. [68:11] This leads to the question of the value of
a warranty if the person owning the equipment does not know
he has one. Until SECNAVINST 4330. XX is published, there is
no standard marking requirement within the Navy. As
reviewed previously, each Systems Command has different
requirements. This problem also extends to the Services.
Which Service marking requirements should be used on a joint
Navy/Air Force program such as the HARM or TOMAHAWK?
Amending MIL-STD-129F to include specific warranty
elements and the format in which they are applied, may
provide a solution. The Army marking requirements outlined
in Chapter III provide a good basis for doing this. With
specific warranty data elements required, flexibility must
be provided by giving the Services the option to include
additional elements.
2. Testing
Large dollar amounts of warranty coverage could
depend on a small test sample. [11:5-62] Because of the
many different operating environments in which a weapon
system must operate, testing in laboratory conditions might
do injustice to any kind of performance guarantees. The
same piece of Navy equipment can be called upon to operate
in both the tropics and the arctic. Two of the contract
clauses reviewed called for lot testing at a specific site.
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If a lot sample passes its warranty inspection, does the
Navy have a claim if one of the untested missiles in the lot
later fails? This appears to be an issue of whether or not
the defect or failure is latent. "If the defect could have
been discovered by a test specified in the contract it is
not latent." [1:600] To negate these possible testing
problems, the Navy must be extremely careful with how its
sampling plans are constructed. Maintaining high confidence
levels in sample testing requires larger samples and
therefore additional costs.
3 . Field Level Problems
a. Maintenance
To maintain the warranty any sensible contractor
should want to periodically inspect and perform preventive
maintenance on "his" equipment. Is the Navy in the position
of maintaining a contractor workforce alongside its ships
and aircraft squadrons? How does this affect security?
[13:32]
This researcher would observe that maintaining
this additional contractor workforce with the various
security requirements is neither feasible nor cost
effective. A more viable option for the contractor would be
to contractually require the Government to provide test or
operational reports, data or information relative to the
operability of the equipment. This provides the contractor
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visibility of the performance of his equipment without
burden to himself or the Navy.
b. Unauthorized Repairs
In an attempt to trouble-shoot a down piece of
gear, a warranty seal may be broken; or an attempt to
increase performance of a piece of equipment , a technician
may "fine tune" his gear. Any of these actions may
invalidate warranty coverage. [68:12] There are few, if
any, procedures in place to preclude or identify these
situations. Only one of the contract clauses reviewed
requires a warranty seal.
4 . Transportation
Depending on the clause in the contract,
transportation costs could become the responsibility of
either the Government or the contractor. Regardless of who
pays, there are several inherent problems. [18:14]
a. Will the warranty information on the equipment provide
required shipping information?
b. Who will provide any specialized packing containers?
Two of the five contract clauses reviewed in Chapter
IV specifically identified that the Government will
provide specialized containers. This would seem
reasonable in view of the fact the Government would
provide specialized containers, if there was no
warranty. In addition, shipboard storage of
specialized contractor designated shipping containers
would prove burdensome.
c. Does the Navy have to add another transportation
management layer to handle warranty equipment? How
much would this affect transportation priority
assignment (TP1, TP2 , TP3
,
) of shipments?
d. Who pays the costs of transportation when the
contractor determines a failed unit is good? Are the
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costs automatically transferred to a previously
established repair order? The answers to these
questions depend on the situation. Each of the
contract clauses reviewed previously, provided
different remedies. These remedies ranged from
sending the good unit back to the original
organization on a Government Bill of Lading (GBL) to
providing the contractor with an equitable adjustment.
It would appear with these costs, the remedy should be
tailored to the contract situation.
e. Most Government repair facilities are in close
proximity to the equipment. Could the failed
equipment be checked and worked on at Government
facilities by contractor personnel?
f. Will the contractor only pay a flat rate for
transportation costs? The difference between Diego
Garcia and San Diego could be substantial.
5. Miscellaneous
The following is a brief summary of problems
identified by Systems Command personnel during interviews.
These problems were not addressed in previous sections.
a. Reliability and maintainability are essentially
probabilistic occurrences. How can a "failure free"
warranty be accommodated with an established MTBF
level warranty?
b. What incentives are provided to the Fleet user for not
voiding a warranty? The program manager is the
individual who decides what type of warranty is used.
He is responsible for any savings in program budget.
c. Conducting cost benefit analysis may prove extremely
difficult on new systems and will depend on failure
data not readily available from older systems.
d. Who establishes which requirements are "essential"
under the new warranty law? What defines "essential"
requirements?
e. With the Navy's policy on "no cost warranties," the
contractor will cover his risk in other areas. One
interviewee noted a significant change in
manufacturing and engineering labor hours between a
nonwarranty RFP and a warranty RFP.
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f. What will be the extra amount of workload on the Fleet
for warranty administration? SECNAVINST 43 3 0. XX
directs that warranty requirements will not burden the
Fleet. Can this actually be accomplished?
g. A warranty cost benefit analysis is required for each
individual weapon system. However, are the overall
system costs of warranty administration taken into
consideration by individual weapon system cost benefit
analysis?
h. The new warranty law has been in effect for over
eighteen months. How can warranty systems management
be implemented without overall Navy policy guidance?
The Hardware Systems Commands continue to procure
warranted weapon systems, but there are no mechanisms
in place for Navy-wide warranty administration.
i. How does a contractor warrant a computer system for
performance when the MTBF is based on Government
provided specifications? What procedures are in place
to mark software for warranty identification?
L. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed a number of issues surrounding
warranty management. These issues included: Cost/Pricing,
Contract Clause Management, Technology, Component Breakout,
Government Furnished Equipment, Subcontractor/Small
Business, Logistics/Program Management, Readiness and a
variety of other possible problems. From the review of
these issues, it would appear that warranties will surely
cost the Navy more money. Even if the contractor supplies
the Navy a "no cost" warranty, the effect on component
breakout and the resultant decrease in competition will
increase costs. Warranty administration will prove to be an
enormous undertaking if the advantages to warranty use are
to be fully realized. This could add another bureaucratic
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layer in weapon system management, which is already
overburdened with paperwork.
The warranty effect on technology and readiness is
harder to define. The contractor is going to reduce his
risk as much as possible to maintain profit. This means
staying with proven equipment. A military commander on the
other hand, will do anything he can, including invalidating
warranties, to carry out his national defense mission.
The variability of "tailored" warranty contract clauses
and different Services and Systems Commands warranty
management procedures may inject confusion at Fleet level
warranty administration. To get any benefit from
warranties, a coordinated effort is required from writing
the contract clause to reporting failed units on a ship.
Are the perceived benefits in increased quality worth all
the extra effort?
The final chapter summarizes the research work.
Conclusions and recommendations identified by the researcher
are provided.
128
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this research effort were as follows:
to identify warranty management procedures within the
Services and the Navy Systems Commands, to review similar
warranty contract clauses to highlight the variability in
warranty contract clause elements, and to discern any actual
or potential problems from warranty procedures developed or
implemented and from contract clauses enacted. In
accomplishing this, several conclusions were reached.
Conclusion #1
—
The primary emphasis with the use of
warranties in the Navy is to ensure the contractor stands
behind his product. Therefore, warranties are used as a
mechanism for shifting risk from the Government to the
contractor for ensuring product quality. The Navy's
un-official policy of "no cost" warranties underscores this.
By forcing the contractor to become more involved with the
reliability of his product after delivery, a number of
benefits can be gained. These benefits range from increased
efforts to design reliability into a weapon system to
reduced weapon system life cycle costs.
Conclusion #2 Since the revised warranty legislation
was passed by Congress over eighteen months ago, the Navy
has vet to publish their warranty guidelines. (SECNAVINST
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4330. XX) . The Army and Air Force have published
comprehensive warranty procedures. The Army procedures are
most explicit. This is demonstrated by the assignment of
warranty management responsibility to specific activities
and promulgation of warranty information through warranty
technical bulletins and the central collection agency for
effective management. The Air Force Warranty Administration
Plan presents general policy requirements and is not quite
as specific as the Army's. Specific implementation
milestones are identified. The Navy draft instruction,
SECNAVINST 4330. XX, presents a broad policy framework for
Navy Warranty Management. Each Navy Systems Command is left
to implement and develop its own procedures such as a
warranty management information system. Because of this,
the user in the field may be faced with a variety of
procedures for warranty management. The impact of
warranties at the Fleet level, both in time and money, is




Each Navy Systems Command, in attempting
to meet the requirements of the law, has used different
methods in accomplishing warranty management. This is
because of the lack of published Navy-wide guidance. The
efforts of the Navy Systems Commands range from published
instructions and warranty guideline manuals by NAVAIR to a
"wait and see" attitude by SPAWAR. The diversity in efforts
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has two serious repercussions: 1) as Navy Systems Commands
continue to acquire and warrant new weapon systems, there is
no encompassing Navy warranty management system, and 2)
redundancy in Navy Systems Commands' actions waste precious
manpower and dollar assets.
Conclusion #4
—
The manner in which warranty clauses are
constructed is affected by a number of important factors.
The weapon system itself and verifiable performance
parameters are the primary factors influencing warranty
contract clause construction. Other variables which may
affect warranty clauses include:
- program requirements
- maturity of the program
- Service or Systems Command regulations
- contractor providing the coverage
- quality and depth of contract administration expertise
available
- contracting officer himself
- user organization's familiarity with warranty handling
- joint service program requirements
Conclusion #5 While DFARS stresses tailored warranty
clauses, there are a number of important elements that
should be included in each warranty contract clause. Each
warranty contract clause must contend with a number of
outside variables as highlighted in Conclusion #4. Despite
these different variables, a number of elements should be in
each clause. The elements include: contractual terms,
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essential performance requirements, duration, marking,
repair and corrective action responsibilities and remedies,
turnaround time, transportation and additional special
clauses. Once these elements are established, they should
be refined to meet program requirements. NAVAIR and NAVSEA
provide various forms of checklists for ensuring the above
elements are addressed in each clause.
Conclusion #6
—
The contractual requirement of a
quarterly review bv a warranty assessment board provides an
excellent management tool for gauging warranty effectiveness
of a particular program. Two of the five warranty contract
clauses reviewed included provisions for warranty assessment
boards. These boards provide an open forum for airing
discrepancies and problems between the contractor and the
Government. It is recognized that because of money, time,
and manpower constraints, establishing warranty assessments
boards is not always practical. Warranty problems, however,
can frequently be resolved in the front end instead of going
through the sometimes lengthy disputes process.
Conclusion #7
—
The Navv has not established an overall
system review for warranty effectiveness. SECNAVINST
4 33 0. XX requires summarized reports on various types of
warranty usage data from the Systems Commands. It is not
clear what will be done with this information. An informal
consensus of opinion questions the actual effectiveness of
warranties. No hard facts were uncovered during the
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research to determine warranty effectiveness. Some type of




Although serious attempts to quantify and
estimate direct and indirect warranty costs factors have
been made, such factors continue to be complicated and hard
to understand. As outlined in Chapter V, there are many
different factors affecting the costs of warranties. None
of the cost estimating models reviewed during the research
provided a viable method for handling indirect costs. Few
personnel interviewed in the Navy Systems Commands knew how
to approach warranty cost estimating. This leads to




More consistency between clauses in
marking requirements and failure reporting would promote
effective warranty management at the user level. Each
contract clause reviewed in Chapter IV addressed primary
warranty clause elements in a somewhat different manner.
Without overall Navy guidance, inconsistent requirements
will continue to be enacted. The user is then faced with a
multiplicity of warranty requirements. Not only is this an
issue within the Navy, but also within the DOD. For
example, each of the programs reviewed in Chapter IV is a
joint service program with the Air Force. Whose procedures
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With the significant number of variables
involved with warranty coverage. buyers and contract
administrators must expend additional effort in negotiating
and administering contracts for weapon systems. This
additional effort adds to the ever increasing number of
regulations with which contracting personnel must contend.
In turn, this only adds to the already lengthy procurement
lead time. Table 2 in Chapter II highlights the fact that
warranties have added anywhere from three to nine months in
negotiations alone. Attempts to resolve or minimize
warranty problems ranging from litigation to component
breakout and competition issues will also contribute to
increased time requirements. A longer procurement lead time
ultimately translates into additional costs, both in dollar
amounts and manpower assets. This effect must be taken into





The Navy currently does not have a
warranty management information system for providing
system-wide visibility of warranties applied. As mentioned
in Chapter III, none of the Navy Systems Commands knew
completely how many warranted weapon systems they had, nor
did they know what provisions were contractually
administered. This information could only be obtained by
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soliciting each individual program. Some of the problems in




Problems of inconsistent marking
requirements between the Systems Commands and Services have
the most noticeable effect with the user. Standardizing
warranty marking requirements has the most visible impact
with warranty administration. The user must first know he
has a warranted item and the requirements associated with
it. Having standardized warranty marking labels facilitates
user warranty management. Training for warranty identifica-
tion and proper utilization is also enhanced.
Conclusion #13 Some of the major problems in
administering Navy warranties not mentioned previously are
as follows; 1) fixed repair turnaround times do not
accommodate excessive return rates. 2) increases in user
workload can be expected because of additional warranty
management controls and requirements. 3) material handling
paperwork lacks notification or annotations that a warranty
applies, 4) Systems Command personnel are unfamiliar with
warranty cost estimating techniques, 5) there is no
comprehensive cross reference document for identifying
warranties, and 6) a timely warranty problem resolution
mechanism is not available at the user levels. Currently it
is difficult to measure the degree of impact of these
problems, because of the newness of the requirements. Many
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of the above problems should be reduced by effective
planning and standardized procedures. Underlying these
problems is the issue of potential increases in costs. When
evaluating warranty administration problems, the costs
involved in rectifying problems must be addressed.
Conclusion #14
—
As of June. 1986 there were no cases
pending or decided by the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals concerning the new warranty laws. Despite this lack
of judiciary precedence, the research literature shows three
particular areas which lend themselves to litigation. These
areas are as follows: 1) Government burden of proof in
warranty claims, 2) timely Government notice of warranty
breach, and 3) implied warranty of Government furnished
specifications and design.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following are recommendations by the researcher
as the result of this study.
Recommendation #1
—
The Department of Defense should
publish and implement warranty requirements that cut across
Service lines. Because of the current push to consolidate
individual Service programs into joint programs such as the
Tomahawk, standardized warranty requirements are essential.
At a minimum, warranty marking requirements and reporting
format should be the same to promote user administration of
warranties. This also applies to the Navy Systems Commands.
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Establishing a new military standard for warranty marking
labels is a possible method for accomplishing this.
Recommendation #2
—
The Navy should publish SECNAVINST
4330. XX as soon as possible. This would give the Systems
Commands a common basis on which to build their own warranty
procedures. Any controversial parts to SECNAVINST 4 3 30. XX
can be amended in the future. Including a milestone
schedule for implementation action in the Instruction,
similar to the Air Force requirement, gives Navy top
management a measure for implementation progress.
Recommendation #3 Investigate and provide training to
Systems Command personnel on the various warranty cost
estimating technioues available. Both the Army and Air
Force have developed a number of various warranty cost
estimating models. The Navy should review these models for
possible use with Navy systems. Spending money upfront in
training personnel on warranty application will produce long
range savings in time and money.
Recommendation #4 Establish a viable warranty review
process process in determining warranty effectiveness within
the Systems Commands. This program can be modeled after the
Army's warranty assessment program. It includes an annual
review of warranty data which includes the following:
frequency and types of claims, disputed and denied claims
activity, contractor quality modifications, an analysis of
the proportional warranty cost to the value of the warranty
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services/remedies received. At the conclusion of the
warranty, a final evaluation is made deriving the total
benefits received against the warranty cost. This
information should be made available within the Systems
Commands to help in revising and constructing future
warranty provisions.
This review process should be established at the program
level and the system level. The program level warranty
assessment board would be similar to those used in the
Sparrow and Harm programs. It should be made up of
Government and contractor technical and contracting
personnel. Although it is recognized that establishing a
board for each program may not be cost effective, boards
should be established depending on complexity of the
warranty or some predetermined program priority such as
acquisition category III (ACAT III)
.
A total system macro evaluation of warranties should
also be accomplished on an annual basis. A board made up of
members from the previously established Warranty Ad Hoc
Group provides an excellent means for accomplishing this.
This board could provide recommendations to the Secretary of
the Navy on the actual overall management of warranties
within the Navy and whether or not warranties are cost
effective from a Navy perspective. This information could
be gathered from the program warranty assessment boards,
reports required by SECNAVINST 43 30. XX, and a warranty
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Establish a Navv-wide Warranty
Management Management Information System (MIS) An
effective Warranty MIS is a key ingredient to overall Navy
management of warranties. Instead of leaving each Systems
Command to develop their own system, a single system would
alleviate redundancy and promote use. The NAVSEA contract
with TECHMATICS, Inc. as described in Chapter III, can
provide the basis for this action.
Recommendation #6
—
Require that contract clauses include
graduated repair turnaround times, based on the quantity of
failed units returned. In the contracts reviewed in Chapter
IV, if failure rate exceeded an established number, the
turnaround would have to be reevaluated and renegotiated.
It is easier and less time consuming to establish




Establish a warranty failed unit
return system requiring minimal effort from the user. This
system could be combined with the current repairable
retrograde system. When a failure occurs, the user
documents the cause of the failure and annotates that a
warranty exists on an OPNAV4790.2K form that accompanies the
failed unit. The unit is then shipped to a repair "hub"
activity such as Naval Supply Center, Norfolk. The "hub"
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activity verifies if a warranty exists, retests the unit for
failure confirmation and forwards the failed unit to the
appropriate contractor. The costs of retesting and
transhipment must be weighed against the costs and liabili-




Annually publish an index of weapon
systems and their applicable warranties. This promotes
increased awareness at the Fleet level of warranty usage.
This information could be obtained from the warranty manage-
ment information system described in Recommendation #5.
Both the costs for publishing this index and the warranty
management information system should be applied as a
surcharge in cost estimating models.
Recommendation #9
—
Mark all issue and receipt
documentation, such as a DD1348-1 with warranty annotations.
By marking issue and receipt documentation, the individual
receiving the equipment is made more aware of warranty
application. This procedure would be similar to how
SUBSAFE/LEVEL I material paperwork is marked currently. The
user is alerted to the fact that special procedures apply.
The annotated paperwork could also caution storage personnel
that special issue or handling procedures apply.
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C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was as follows:
What are the key problems in management of Navy warranty
contract clauses as the result of the new regulations
mandating cost effective warranty coverage for major weapon
systems and how might warranty administration be improved?
The issues of warranty costs and the estimation of those
costs permeate the various problems surrounding warranty
management. In addition to being extremely hard to
estimate, only a few Systems Commands personnel know how to
apply warranty costs. Although current warranty litigation
cases could not be identified, the researcher believes it is
only a matter of time before the courts get involved. The
increasing emphasis on competition and component breakout in
the Navy seems to run in a direction counter to warranty
coverage. The costs of going with pedigreed parts to
maintain a warranty and the difficulties in administering
two different warranty plans for the same weapon system are
difficult to quantify. The warranty problems with technolo-
gy readiness are also hard to define with the full effect
not being felt for several years.
One method for improving warranty administration is
through detailed planning early in weapon system
development. Requiring this to be accomplished in the
Integrated Logistics Support Plan for a weapon system can
help ensure this happens.
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Although cost is a major factor, administration of
warranties must be carefully analyzed for the Navy to
realize the full benefits of warranties. In applying
warranties from a contractual standpoint, alternate means of
motivating the contractor for better quality should be
evaluated. For example, in the commercial contract warranty
clause reviewed in Chapter IV, the contractor is given more
money from an award/ fee pool if the equipment exceeds an
established performance level instead of being penalized for
not meeting a performance level. It depends on what
motivates the contractor.
Warranties will affect almost every facet of major
weapon system acquisition and management. The challenge is
to identify those effects and plan accordingly.
The subsidiary research questions were as follows:
What is a warranty and how is it applied to Navv weapon
systems?
Essentially a warranty is similar to an insurance policy
for the buyer in guaranteeing certain product quality
requirements. The seller assumes the risk that the product
may fail during the warranty period. This shift in risk
generally translates into increased costs to the buyer. The
Navy's unofficial position is that the Navy should not have
to pay the contractor additional amounts of money for
something he should be doing in the first place. The Navy
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includes the following warranty coverage when deemed cost
effective and meeting statutory requirements:
- Design and Manufacturing
- Materials and Workmanship
- Essential Performance Requirements
Each warranty contract clause is tailored to fit the
situation and the weapon system itself.
What are the current Navy warranty administration
procedures and what are the critical problems in applying
those procedures?
The Navy has yet to publish overall policy guidance on
warranty administration. NAVSEA has developed generic
warranty clauses and published a warranty reference
document. NAVAIR, in addition to publishing a warranty
reference document and generic warranty clause, has
generated command-wide warranty administration procedures.
SPAWAR has also developed generic warranty clauses and has
conducted warranty training seminars. NAVSUP is in the
process of generating supply procedures for managing
warranties. There are no established completion dates for
the draft procedures mentioned above.
The major problem in applying warranty administration
procedures is the lack of consistency between Systems
Commands warranty requirements. This compounds problems
experienced at the user level.
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What are the principal variables or factors which affect
warranty administration?
The outside influences which affect warranties include:
1) equipment type, 2) program requirements, 3) maturity
of the program, 4) Service or Systems Command regulations,
5) the contractor providing the coverage, 6) the quality
and depth of contract administration expertise available,
and 7) the contracting officer himself.
The following elements should be addressed in warranty
contract clause construction:
- Contractual Terms and Definition
- Essential Performance Requirements
- Duration
- Marking
- Repair and Corrective Action Responsibilities
- Turnaround Time
- Transportation
- Additional Special Clauses
At a minimum each of the above elements should be included
in a warranty contract clause.
What significant court cases and Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals cases have occurred involving warranty
administration of manor weapon systems, and what precedents
can be applied?
As of June 198 6 it was found that there were no cases
pending or decided by the Armed Services Board of Contract
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Appeals concerning the new warranty laws. A review of the
literature indicated there are three major areas of
potential litigation. These three areas include: 1) The
burden of proof is placed on the Government in proving
warranty claims against the contractor, 2) The Government
is responsible for providing timely notice that the warranty
has been breached, and 3) Does the implied warranty of
Government furnished design and specifications take
precedence over a contractor warranty? The above issues are
only a few of the examples within the potentially costly
litigation arena.
What modifications could be made to existing warranty
provisions in order to enhance the administration of such
warranties?
Several changes to current practices are included in the
recommendation sections. These changes are summarized as
follows:
- Establish DOD wide military standard for warranty
marking requirements.
- Establish one Navy-wide warranty management information
system instead of separate systems for each Systems
Command
.
- Set up a formal review or assessment process for total
system-wide warranty coverage.
- Provide training to Systems Command personnel on the
various warranty cost estimating techniques available.
- Include graduated repair turnaround times based on the
quantity of failed units returned in warranty contract
clause.
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- Annually publish an index of weapon systems and their
applicable warranties.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
This research only touched the surface of the many
implications of the new warranty requirements for major
weapon systems. The following areas are identified for
potential research:
1. What is the workload impact of warranties at Fleet




How should Navy inventory management models be changed
to accommodate the use of warranties?
3 How can system-wide warranty administration costs be
quantified? These costs include functions such as
operation of a Navy warranty management information
system. How are these costs included in cost
estimating models?
4 What is the long term effect of warranties on the
industrial base?
5. How are surge and mobilization capabilities affected?
6. What do operational commanders perceive as the major




The following is a list of people who either were
interviewed or directly provided information necessary for
this research. Appendix B provides a general list of
questions used in interviews. Interviews consisted of both
telephone and personal visits.
A. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
(SHIPBUILDING AND LOGISTICS)
1. Morris, W. R. Capt, SC, USN, Deputy Director Contracts
and Business Management, 12 December 1985.
2. Thompson, T. , Office of Contracts and Business
Management (CBMMA) , 22 April 1986.
3. Williams, M. , Office of Contracts and Business
Management (CBM-CM) , 19 June 1986.
B. NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND
1. Hein, J. J. Cdr, SC, USN, Deputy Director Missiles and
Systems Contract Division, (AIR-216A) , 9 June 1986.
2. Hesch, G. F. Cdr, SC, USN, Business/Financial Manager,
A6/EA-6, (PMA-2 34B) , 23 June 1986.
3. Harper, S., PCO Harm Missile, (AIR-216A1) 24 June 1986.
4. Muth, R. , PCO Sidewinder Missile, (AIR-21611) , 19
September 1986.
5. Shields, P., PCO Sparrow Missile, (AIR-21615) , 11
September 1986.
6. Goldberg, A., Engineering Support & Product Integrity
Management Division, (AIR-5162) , 24 June 1986.
7. Rannenberg, J. E. LCdr, SC, USN, Contract Support
Services Section, (AIR-21627) , 15 April 1986.
8. Deets, D. M. LCdr, SC, USN, Contract Specialist Range
Section, (AIR-21624) , 26 June 1986.
C. NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
1. Donatuti, R. N. , Director Shipbuilding/Overhaul
Contracts Division (SEA 022), 18 July 1986.
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2. Heffron, M. , Assistant Director, Acquisition Planning
Division (SEA 901 A), 24 June 1986.
3. Marchetti, R. A. Cdr, SC, USN, Division Director
(Business/Financial Management) , SSN 21 Acquisition
Program, (PDS-3502), 16 January 1986.
4. Kerner, C. W. , Acquisition Management and Policy
Section, (02C8) , 28 July 1986.
D. SPACE AND NAVAL WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND
1. Schroeder, J. A., Capt, SC, USN, Deputy Commander
Contracts Directorate, (SPAWAR-02) , 14 February 1986.
2. Weber, D. , Acquisition Plans and Policy Branch, (SPAWAR-
2011) , 23 June 1986.
3. Sloan, G. D. , Production Management Branch, Life Cycle
Engineering & Platform Directorate, (SPAWAR-8112) , 23
June 1986.
4. Fristch, F. , Cost Analysis/Estimating Office,
(SPAWAR-8211) , 5 August 1986.
E. JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE
1. Nicklas, J. G. , LtCol, USAF, Program Manager, Ship
System Production & Fleet Engineering Support Division
(PMA-2823), 25 June 1986.
2. Cronauer, H. T., Cdr, SC, USN, Business/Financial
Manager, Ship Systems Production & Fleet Engineering
Support Division, (PMA-2822B) , 26 February 1986.
3. McGrath, C. M. , LCdr, SC, USN, Business/Financial
Manager, Ship Systems Production & Fleet Engineering
Support Division, (PMA-2822B) , 25 June 1986.
F. NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND
1. Barnett, O. T., Cdr, SC, USN, Spares Competition &
Logistics Technology, (PML-550) , 25 June 1986.
2. Moseley, A. S., Lt, SC, USN, Logistics Plans & Policy
Control Division, (SUP-0311) , 25 June 1986.
G. SHIPS PARTS CONTROL CENTER
1. Phoenix, W. , Harm Missile Program Branch, (SPCC 05224B)
,
18 July 1986.
H. AVIATION SUPPLY OFFICE
1. Wilsker, 0., Acquisition Plans and Policy Office,
Contracts Division, 18 July 1986.
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I. ARMY
1. Freeman, N. , Army Material Command, Product Assurance &
Testing Directorate, Warranty Division, 17 July 1986.
J. AIR FORCE
1. Engman, R. A., LtCol , USAF, Of ficer-in-Charger , Product
Performance Agreement Center, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Dayton, Ohio, 20 June 1986.
2. Max, J., Deputy Director, Product Performance Agreement
Center, 20 June 1986.
3. Howitz, T. , IstLt, USAF, Assistant to the Deputy
Director, Product Performance Agreement Center, 2 June
1986.
K. AUDIT AGENCIES
1. Capizzi, D. A., Cdr, SC, USN, Assistant for
Investigation (Procurement) , Office of Naval Inspector
General, 23 June 1986.
2. Johnson, R. , Col, USMC, Director, Naval Audit Service
Western Region, 22 May 1986.
3. Kruper, G. , General Accounting Office, Detroit Regional
Office, 7 May 1986.
4. Pennisi, R. , Department of Defense Inspector General,
Office of Assistant Inspector General, Auditing, 2 May
1986.
5. Husband, W. , Headquarters Air Force Audit Agency, Norton
AFB, 28 May 1986.
L. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
1. Russell, J., Contracts Branch, Sikorsky Aircraft
Division, United Technologies Corp. , Stratford, CT, 13
January 1986.
2. Judson, R. , Director of Contracts, Hughes Satellite
Division, Hughes Aircraft Company, Los Angeles, CA, 2 2
May 1986.
3. Gottlieb, S., Director of Contracts, ESL Corp,
Sunnyvale, CA, 3 January 1986.
4. Stone, M. , Contracts Branch, ARGOSystems Corp,




The following is a list of questions used in personal
interviews or discussions with those individuals listed in
Appendix A. Not all questions were asked of the same
individual. Only those questions deemed appropriate for
that situation and individual were used.
1. What are your organization's current warranty
administration procedures?
2. How has your organization implemented Section 2403 to
Title 10 U.S.C. and DFARS Subpart 4 6?
3
.
In your opinion what are the principal variables or
factors affecting management of warranties for major
weapon systems?
4. What is your perceived impact of the new public law
requirement for warranties in major Navy weapon system
contracts?
5 What problems do you foresee or have encountered in
implementing the new warranty requirements in your
organization?
6. How would you modify current or planned warranty
administration procedures to make them more effective?
7. Do you feel that contractors will provide products of
better quality as a result of the system level warranty
law?
8. How many weapon systems managed by your organization
have been warranted since the new warranty laws were
enacted? When will these warranties become
"operational"?
9. How are warranties applied within a contractual
framework?
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10. How do acquisition plans in your organization address
the planned use of warranties?
11. Does your organization perform warranty cost/benefit
analysis? Is it included with the contract or
acquisition plan?
12. How much does a warranty cost from your experience?
13. What are the key elements in putting together a warranty
contract clause?
14. Does your organization use any model warranty clauses?
If yes, can you provide examples?
15. Has your organization used the DOD or Air Force model
warranty clauses? What has your experience been with
these clauses?
16. Has the requirement for warranties affected contract
negotiations? If yes, in what manner?
17. What determined the amount of field level interaction
with warranty contractual requirements? What type of
actions were expected from the Fleet user?
18. What is the contractor's role in warranty administration
of your program? How was that role developed?
19. What problems do you have in developing warranty
contractual requirements?
20. What problems do you foresee in administering the
warranty requirements of your program?
21. Who is the key warranty administration person at the
contract administration activity who is involved with
your program? Would you mind if I contacted him
directly?
22. Who is the key warranty administration person at the
prime contractor who is involved with your program?
Would you mind if I contacted him directly?
23. How were the following key warranty factors developed
contractually for your program?
a. Essential performance requirements.
b. Proper marking.
c. Turnaround time/liquidated damages.
d. Repair and corrective action responsibilities and
remedies.
e. Warranty duration and depth.
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f. Investigation of cost responsibility.
g. Enforcement,
h. Tracking.
25. What is your perceived impact of warranties on user
maintenance operations and the Navy logistics systems?
26. What is your perceived impact of warranties on defense
contractors? Small businesses?
27. Has your organization used or provided warranty data to
the Joint Service Data Base, Product Performance
Agreement Center (PPAC) , located at Wright-Patterson
AFB, Dayton, Ohio?
28. Do warranties discourage contractors from bidding on
Navy contracts? If yes, why?
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APPENDIX C
WARRANTIES BY CONCEPT GROUP [ 69: 4-121
WARRANTY OF SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT
UNDER 10 USE 2403
o Essential Performance Requirements Guarantee
o Design and Manufacturing Requirements Guarantee
o Materials and Workmanship Guarantee
EXPANDED WARRANTY OF SYSTEMS AND
EQUIPMENT UNDER 10 USE 2403




o Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) Warranty
o Availability Warranty
o Component Reliability Warranty
o Model Engine Warranty
COMPREHENSIVE PERFORMANCE/
CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES CLAUSES
o Model Engine Warranty
o Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW)
o Mean-Time-Between-Failure Guarantee with Verification
Test (MTBF VT)
o RIW with MTBF VT
o Reliability and Maintainability Improvement
Warranty (R&MIW)
o R&MIW with MTBF VT
o Availability Guarantee
o Chronic LRU Guarantee
o Spare Parts Level Warranty
o Logistics Support Cost Guarantee
o Maximum Parts Cost Guarantee
SUPPORT/SUPPORT COST
WARRANTIES
o Spare Parts Level Warranty
o Logistics Support Cost Guarantee
o Maximum Parts Cost Guarantee
o Method of Test Guarantee
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o Test and Repair Improvement Guarantee
o Fault Detection, Isolation, and Repair Warranty
o Quality of Training Materials Warranty
SOFTWARE/SOFTWARE SUPPORT
WARRANTIES
o Software Design Commitment Guarantee
o LRU Software Configuration Control and Support Agreement
o Fault Detection, Isolation, and Repair Warranty
o Test and Repair Improvement Guarantee
o Method of Test Guarantee
o Utility Functions Guarantee
o Warranty of Technical Data
o Warranty of Technical Orders
SPECIAL FEATURES
WARRANTIES
o Rewarranty of Repaired/Overhauled Equipment
o Repair/Exchange Agreements
o Chronic LRU Warranty
o Spare Parts Level Warranty
o Maximum Parts Cost Guarantee
o Ultimate Life Guarantee
o Commercial Service Life Guarantee
o LRU Software Configuration Control and Support Agreement
o Fault Detection, Isolation, and Repair Warranty
o Method of Test Guarantee
o Test and Repair Improvement Guarantee
o Quality of Training Materials Warranty
o Warranty of Technical Data
o Warranty of Technical Orders
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APPENDIX D
WARRANTY PROVISIONS AND COST EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Defects in Material and Workmanship. The basis for
establishing the cost of this warranty coverage is
historical claim data. For the initial production buy, data
from similar type engine lines (preferably of the same
manufacturer) should be used. For subsequent lots, data
from the previous lots can be examined keeping in mind that
manufacturing quality should be improving and warranty cost
decreasing. This is a measure of cost effectiveness for
this type warranty.
2. Product Performance Warranty. The primary element of
cost for this warranty is the allowance for risk that the
engine will not perform according to specification.
Assuming the design does work, the only expected claims
would be for those low probability failures allowed by the
design criteria. The warranty cost should cover these
failures. The analyst should assess potential liability by
evaluating the cost of deficiencies. The deficiencies and
the resulting impacts should be provided by engineering,
based upon government experience with similar systems. All
remedies specified in the warranty should be included in the
analysis. Having estimated the potential liability, the
warranty cost can be negotiated based upon expected risk.
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3. Reliability Improvement Warranty. The key to cost
assessment for RIW is in establishing a reasonable, yet
challenging reliability growth prediction for the engine.
This can be done by first assessing the reliability at fleet
introduction and then applying an appropriate reliability
growth prediction technique. A redesign allowance is a
significant element of the cost of RIW and should be largest
in the first years of acquisition and declining as
reliability growth is achieved. The total cost should be
set such that if no significant growth in reliability
occurs, both the cost allowed for claims and the redesign
allowance are more than depleted thereby reducing contractor
profit. A well understood reliability baseline is
essential. In addition, a multi-year procurement will allow
a more realistic assessment and negotiation of costs,
especially redesign costs which are not linear with time and
are not necessarily proportional to acquisition quantities.
(Excerpt from "A Unified Approach for Pricing Propulsion
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